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Inherent Product Hazards*
BY DAVID G. OWEN**
INTRODUCTION
A 11 products are dangerous; each amalgamation of molecules
involves some risk of harm. Unavoidable dangers inhere in every
product-they cannot be eliminated without destroying the product's
purpose or desirability. Conspiring with the frailty of human cognition and
skill, gravity and other natural forces assure that thousands of children are
injured, and sometimes killed, on bicycles, jungle gyms, and trampolines
each year. Thousands of adults die annually from misadventures with
automobiles, prescription drugs, cigarettes, alcohol, and guns. Under
circumstances of extended or improper use, even the most innocuous
products can become instruments of injury, disease, or death. Peanut butter
and marshmallows can gag and suffocate young children;' baseballs hit
with aluminum bats can strike pitchers in the head;' cotton garments can
ignite and burn those who wear them;3 hot chocolate, tea, and coffee can
scald those who drink them;4 sleds can propel riders down snowy hills into
* © 2005 David G. Owen and West Publishing. This article is from DAVID G. OWEN,
PRODUCTS LIABILrrY LAW § 10.3 (2005).
- Carolina Distinguished Professor of Law, University of South Carolina. Special
thanks to Stephen Hall, David Watkins, Alyson Campbell, Rochelle Oldfield, Aaron Dias,
and Amy Neuschafer for research and editorial assistance.
E.g., Fraust v. Swift & Co., 610 F. Supp. 711, 712 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (recounting a
situation in which a child choked on peanut butter); Emery v. Federated Foods, Inc., 863
P.2d 426, 428 (Mont. 1983) (discussing an incident in which a child gagged on
marshmallows).
2 Compare Sanchez v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002) (holding that pitcher was allowed to pursue a claim that a bat was defectively
designed) with Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 230 N.W.2d
794, 799 (Wis. 1975) (Wilkie, J., dissenting) (stating that a baseball bat is an unavoidably
unsafe product).
'E.g., Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 495 A.2d 348, 351 (Md. 1985) (noting that
an adult was severely burned when her flannel nightgown caught fire); Gryc v.
Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 729 (Minn. 1980) (recounting a situation in which
a child's pajamas caught fire).
4 E.g., Garlinger v. Hardee's Foodsystems, Inc., 16 Fed. App. 232, 233 (4th Cir. 200 1)
(applying West Virginia law to an incident in which plaintiff suffered second-degree bums
after spilling hot coffee on her lap); McCroy v. Coastal Mart, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 1265,
1267, 1275 n. 12 (D. Kan. 2002) (noting that plaintiff was severely burned when he spilled
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trees;' and, over-time, butter and fast foods can cause obesity, diabetes,
heart attacks, and death.6 In a world in which risk is a certain result of every
step and breath, courts must be cautious in assuming the responsibility of
declaring entire categories of products-especially those widely understood
to be inherently hazardous because of their inescapable, generic risks-to
be "good" or "bad." The question of whether courts should make such
sweeping judgments has been called the "last frontier" of products liability
law,7 a border land where fights erupt over whether manufacturers should
be held responsible, without the usual proof of defect, for selling products
adjudged by a court or jury to do more harm than good.8
hot chocolate in his lap and providing an extensive review of hot beverage cases);
Immormino v. J & M Powers, Inc., 91 Ohio Misc. 2d 198, 200 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1 1998)
(recounting a situation in which plaintiff suffered bums after spilling tea in her lap).
'E.g., Jordon v. K-Mart Corp., 611 A.2d 1328, 1329 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
6E.g., Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512,516 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting
that plaintiffs alleged that McDonald's' description of its products caused minors to become
obese), vacated inpart by 396 F.3d 508 (2d Cir. 2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A cmt. i (1965) (noting that butter can cause cholesterol and heart attacks).
'But see James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products
Liability Frontier: The Rejection ofLiability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1263, 1329
(1991) (arguing that products liability law has reached its limits, so the frontier in this area
of law has closed).
8 On product category liability, see generally DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LAW § 10.3 (2005). For a criticism of product category liability, see Richard C. Ausness,
Product CategoryLiability. A Critical Analysis, 24 N. KY. L. REv. 423 (1997); Harvey M.
Grossman, CategoricalLiability: Why the Gates ShouldBe Kept Closed, 36 S. TEx. L. REv.
385 (1995); James A. Henderson & Frank B. Ingersoll, Echoes of Enterprise Liability in
Product Design and Marketing Litigation, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 958 (2002); Henderson &
Twerski, supra note 7; Michael I. Krauss, Regulation Masquerading as Judgment: Chaos
Masquerading as Tort Law, 71 Miss. L.J. 631, 666-85 (2001) (discussing lead paint). For
a favorable discussion of product category liability, see Carl T. Bogus, War on the Common
Law: The Struggle at the Center of Products Liability, 60 MO. L. REv. 1, 88 (1995); Ellen
Wertheimer, The Smoke Gets in Their Eyes: Product Category Liability and Alternative
Feasible Designs in the Third Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1429, 1454 (1994). See
generally Symposium, Generic Products Liability- The Third Revolution in Products
Liability, 72 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 3 (1996) (including articles by Bogus, Bell, Page, Phillips,
Powers, and Wertheimer); Franklin E. Crawford, Note, Fit for Its Ordinary Purpose?
Tobacco, Fast Food, and the Implied Warranty of Merchantability, 63 OHIo ST. L.J. 1165
(2002). For additional articles, see discussions of specific product categories infra Part II.
The notions of "generic risk" and "product category" liability have only recently begun to
surface in the products liability literature, and the meaning and significance of the concepts
are still in flux. Note that these concepts substantially overlap with those of "unavoidable
danger" and "state of the art." The "generic risk" phrase may be traced to an article by
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In a legal world where responsibility is formally based on fault, the
scope of a manufacturer's liability for supplying products of whatever
degree of danger is quite clear: the manufacturer must take all reasonable
measures proportionate to the risk to reduce foreseeable risks of harm.
Normally, this means that a manufacturer must exercise reasonable care to
eliminate from its products all substantial dangers that can reasonably be
designed away, warn consumers about all substantial hidden dangers that
remain, make its products carefully to minimize dangerous manufacturing
flaws, and act carefully to avoid misrepresenting its product's safety. Under
a negligence regime, if manufacturers exercise reasonable care in all of
these respects, consumers must bear responsibility for any dangers
remaining in daily use of the products, whether those dangers are
characterized as "defects," "inherent hazards," or "generic risks."'
During the 1960s, the foundation of the legal regime governing product
accidents in America changed nominally from requiring a finding of fault
to "strict liability. '"" At its inception, the doctrine of strict products liability
appeared to accomplish a broad-based shift of responsibility for
product-related injuries away from consumers and onto product suppliers
and manufacturers, who were viewed as better risk-bearers than the victims
of product accidents.12 This far-reaching shift in the apparent basis of
liability for product accidents raised fundamental questions about how far
a manufacturer's liability should extend for the inevitably harmful results
of generically hazardous products. For example, butter causes cholesterol
problems and heart attacks, drugs have dangerous side-effects, cigarettes
cause lung disease, and alcohol results in liver damage. Indeed, when the
nascent concept of strict products liability in tort was first debated and
developed in the 1950s and 1960s, the question of the proper scope of
supplier responsibility for such inherent or "generic" risks in certain
categories of products-for example, food, drugs, whiskey, and
cigarettes-was one of the central issues of concern to Dean Prosser and
other scholars of the day. 3
Joseph A. Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against Comment k and for Strict Tort
Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 853, 856-57 (1983), the first explicit foray into the interrelated
and knotty issues here involved.
'See OWEN, supra note 8, at ch. 2.
S id.
"See id. § 5.2.
'2 See id. § 5.4.
13 See id. § 6.2 (discussing development of comments ij, and k to § 402A on liability
for generic risks); id. § 10.4 (discussing unavoidable dangers and state of the art); David G.
Owen, The Puzzle of Commentj, 55 HASTINGs L.J. 1377 (2004).
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It was clear to these scholars, particularly as they molded and debated
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, that manufacturers of
unavoidably hazardous products could only be expected to assure that their
products were free of production defects and contained warnings of
foreseeable hidden dangers. 4 Presumably, in order to avoid the possibility
that the new "strict liability" doctrine might be stretched further and
misconstrued as permitting a challenge to the design ofproducts possessing
such inherent dangers, Dean Prosser and the American Law Institute
("ALl") explicitly excluded such an obligation from the new strict tort
doctrine. In particular, comments i, j, and k to section 402A of the
Restatement made clear that the only duties of manufacturers of inherently
dangerous products-such as alcoholic beverages, prescription drugs,
cigarettes, certain foods, and otherproducts whose risks cannot be designed
away-are to avoid manufacturing defects and to warn consumers of
hidden dangers.15 Thus, even though such products are unavoidably unsafe
precisely because their risks cannot be removed without destroying their
utility, the Restatement does not allow a claim that such products are
defective in design.
This article examines a manufacturer's responsibility for harm resulting
from inherently dangerous products by exploring the doctrinal debate and
judicial and statutory experience concerning several prominent types of
inherently dangerous products. Part I considers the struggle to define
product "defect" in a manner compatible with evolving theories on whether
manufacturers or consumers properly bear responsibility for inherent
product hazards. Part II surveys several types of inherently hazardous
products that have generated significant litigation: alcoholic beverages,
cigarettes, firearms, drugs, asbestos, lead paint, and fast foods. Part III
examines various types of reform legislation designed to protect
manufacturers and other sellers from responsibility for accidental harm
involving such products. Part IV concludes that manufacturers of inherently
' 4 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmts. i, j, k (1965).
"5 See OWEN, supra note 8, §§ 6.2, 10.4. Comment i provides that products such as
ordinary food and drugs are not unreasonably dangerous. It also notes that sugar is deadly
to diabetics, castor oil was used as an instrument of torture by Mussolini, and that
uncontaminated whiskey, tobacco, and butter are similar examples of products containing
inherent, but not unreasonable, dangers. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i
(1965). Comments] and k further develop the notion that sellers of inherently dangerous
food and drugs (assuming that they are properly prepared and packaged) have only one duty:
to warn consumers of hidden risks. Id. cmts. j, k.
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dangerous products properly bear responsibility for failing to warn
consumers of hidden dangers, and certainly must bear it for misleading
consumers about substantial product hazards. However, consumers must
remain responsible for the residuum of risk from inherent hazards of which
they are aware.
I. JUDICIAL REJECTION OF DESIGN LIABILITY FOR INHERENT DANGERS
In recent decades, the doctrinal debate over liability for inherent
product hazards has centered on whether a product can properly be viewed
as legally "defective" because its overall social costs exceed its overall
social benefits. 6 Two prominent and controversial examples are cheap
handguns that are used by criminals to maim and kill, but possess little
positive value, even for self-defense, and cigarettes, which sicken and kill
hundreds of thousands of Americans each year for the "benefit" of
satisfying an addiction. 7 A handful of courts 8 and a number of com-
6 See Professor Carl Bogus's explanation of the essence of the "generic liability"
debate:
Generic liability, or product category liability as it is also called, involves products
that remain unreasonably dangerous despite the best possible construction, design
and warnings. Some argue that products liability should end at this point, that a
manufacturer who has done everything feasible to make its product reasonably
safe ought not be subject to strict liability. Others contend that a manufacturer has
a duty not to put unreasonably dangerous products, i.e., products that have a
greater social cost than social benefit, into the stream of commerce, and that a
manufacturer who cannot feasibly make his product reasonably safe can elect not
to distribute his product at all [or, Bogus might say, pay for its accident costs]. To
many, generic liability is a radical concept: it raises the specter of courts deciding
which products may and may not be distributed, and they perceive it as a judicial
usurpation of legislative authority.
Bogus, supra note 8, at 8-9.
"7 Compare Gary T. Schwartz, Cigarette Litigation's Offspring: Assessing Tort Issues
Related to Guns, Alcohol, & Other Controversial Products In Light of the Tobacco Wars,
27 PEPP. L. REv. 751, 751 (2000) (noting the "undeniably significant benefits" of cigarettes,
such as their flavor, ability to enhance concentration, and service as antidepressants and
tranquilizers, which make them, "[t]o that extent.., a kind of miracle drug [that is] available
... without going through the costly intervention of any physician"), with Wertheimer, supra
note 8, at 1443 (stating that cigarettes are an "example of a product which is dangerous,
useless, and without alternative feasible design").
18 Three such cases were noted in the Products Liability Restatement Reporters:
Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110, 115-16 (La. 1986) (finding that
asbestos manufacturers are subject to strict liability for products that fail the social
2004-20051
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mentators 19 have taken the position that a product can fail a risk-utility test
applied to the product as a whole, as distinguished from the normal
risk-utility test based on proof that the manufacturer's failure to adopt a
particular safety feature rendered the product's design defective.2" In some
risk-utility test); Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143, 1158-59 (Md. 1985) (holding
a manufacturer of a "Saturday Night Special" cheap handgun liable for criminal use of the
gun where its overall dangerexceeded its benefits); O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298,
306-07 (N.J. 1983) (holding that a jury could find that the slippery vinyl bottom of a
swimming pool rendered the pool defective even if there was no way to avoid risk). Each of
these cases was eventually overruled by statute. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt.
d & reporter's note (IV)(D) (1998).
One case that articulates the global risk-utility ("macro-balancing") approach to design
liability in dictum (since the case involved warnings claims), and distinguishes this approach
from the conventional, narrower, micro-balance standard is Beshada v. Johns-Manville
Products Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 545 (N.J. 1982):
[W]e can distinguish two tests for determining whether a product is safe: (1) does
its utility outweigh its risk? and (2) if so, has that risk been reduced to the greatest
extent possible consistent with the product's utility? The first question looks to the
product as it was in fact marketed. If that product caused more harm than good,
it was not reasonably fit for its intended purposes. We can therefore impose strict
liability for the injuries it caused without having to determine whether it could
have been rendered safer. The second aspect of strict liability, however, requires
that the risk from the product be reduced to the greatest extent possible without
hindering its utility. Whether or not the product passes the initial risk-utility test,
it is not reasonably safe if the same product could have been made or marketed
more safely.
Id.
Also, in dictum, other courts have opined that, in rare cases, a court mayjustifiably find
that a product's overall dangers exceed its overall social benefits. See, e.g., Armentrout v.
FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175, 185 n. 1 (Colo. 1992) (en banc); Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407
N.W.2d 92,97 n.8 (Minn. 1987) ("Conceivably, rare cases may exist where the product may
be judged unreasonably dangerous because it should be removed from the market rather than
be redesigned."); Rix v. Gen. Motors Corp., 723 P.2d 195, 201 (Mont. 1986); Wilson v.
Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1328 n.5 (Or. 1978).
19 See, e.g., Peter A. Bell, Children 's Lives, Indonesians 'Lives, and Generic Liability,
72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 21, 74 (1996); Carl T. Bogus, The Third Revolution in Products
Liability, 72 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 3, 11 (1996); Bogus, supra note 8, at 8-9 (1995); Ellen
Wertheimer, Unavoidably Unsafe Products: A Modest Proposal, 72 C[l.-KENTL.REv. 189,
189 (1996); see also Joseph A. Page, Liabiliry for Unreasonably and Unavoidably Unsafe
Products: Does Negligence Doctrine Have a Role to Play?, 72 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 87,
88-89 (1996).
20 On the perils ofjudicial "macro-balancing," as compared to the more limited judicial
task of "micro-balancing," the costs and benefits of particular design improvements, see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS reporter's note (IV)(D) cmt. f (1998); David G. Owen,
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cases, the argument goes, even though there is no practicable way to design
away the product's inherent danger, a product may still be adjudged
defective at a global level if it fails a "macro-balance" of its social costs
and benefits-i. e., if, on balance and in the aggregate, the product is simply
"bad." Yet, the vast majority of courts have been markedly unreceptive to
the call that they displace markets, legislatures, and governmental agencies
by decreeing whole categories of products to be "outlaws. 21
Both the Second and Third Restatements endorse this highly restrained
judicial approach. As previously stated, the Second Restatement addresses
unavoidably dangerous products in comments i,, and k. These comments
make clear that a manufacturer of such products must avoid manufacturing
defects (such as contamination) and must warn of hidden dangers.22 But the
central message ofthe SecondRestatement's comments, written in response
to the main concern at the time about the reach of the new strict liability
doctrine, is that a manufacturer of useful but unavoidably dangerous
products is not liable for making them available to a public who desires
them, despite knowledge of their inherent risks.23
The ThirdRestatement adheres to the principle that entire categories of
products commonly understood to be inherently dangerous-such as
alcoholic beverages, firearms, and above-ground swimming pools, but not
cigarettes24-cannot, as a general rule, be judicially classified as
Risk-Utility Balancing in Design Defect Cases, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 239, 242-45
(1997); David G. Owen, Toward a Proper Test for Design Defectiveness: "Micro-
Balancing" Costs and Benefits, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1661, 1664, 1689-91 (1997) (explaining
that proper design defect determinations rest upon a balance of the marginal costs and
benefits of particular alternative design features).
21 See, e.g., Jones v. Amazing Prods., Inc., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1248-51 (N.D. Ga.
2002) (dealing with drain cleaner containing 97% sulfuric acid). For a discussion of
individual products, see infra notes 33, 36-38. Manufacturers of cigarettes and cheap
handguns could ill afford, of course, to pay for all the harm they cause without increasing
the prices of their products considerably. However, a judicial policy that would require
manufacturers to internalize the full injury costs of such products, despite its inefficiency,
does have a variety of social benefits to commend it. See OWEN, supra note 8, § 5.4. Judicial
decisions do not, of course, truly outlaw the sale of such products because manufacturers
may continue to sell them and compensate persons injured thereby. See David G. Owen,
Product Outlaws, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 126, 127 (2000). See generally RESTATEMENT
(TH RD) OF TORTS § 2(b), reporter's note IV(D) (1998).
22 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmts. i, j, k (1965).
23 See, e.g., Myers v. Philip Morris Co., 50 P.3d 751, 755 56 (Cal. 2002); see also
OWEN, supra note 8, at § 6.2; Owen, supra note 13.
24 RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OFTORTS § 2(b) (1998). Restatement (Third) of Torts section
2 (Proposed Final Draft 1997) included tobacco among the small category of products
2004-2005]
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"defective" in design. That is, the ThirdRestatement takes the position that
plaintiffs in design defect cases must establish that the manufacturer failed
to adopt a reasonable method for designing away the danger-an
impossible task, of course, if a product's inherent risks are, by hypothesis,
unavoidable.2" Similar to the Second Restatement, however, the Third
Restatement proclaims that provisional immunity from design liability in
no way immunizes manufacturers of inherently dangerous products from
the duties to manufacture such products free of dangerous defects or to
warn consumers of any foreseeable, hidden dangers they may contain, for
these are independent duties for manufacturers of every type of product.26
In addition, the Third Restatement recognizes that some courts27 have quite
reasonably retained wiggle room to rule, in rare cases, that an "egregiously
unacceptable" product may be of "manifestly unreasonable design," even
if there is no reasonable way to design the danger away.2 8 In these cases,
"the extremely high degree of danger posed by [the product's] use or
consumption so substantially outweighs its negligible social utility that no
rational, reasonable person, fully aware of the relevant facts, would choose
immunized from judicial scrutiny. During the American Law Institute [hereinafter ALl]
debate on final approval, Professor Dratler of the University of Hawaii moved to strike the
word "tobacco" from the list, arguing that the then- escalating assault on the tobacco
industry made the ALI sanctuary for tobacco inappropriate. Over objection by the Reporters,
who reasoned that the law did not justify removing tobacco from its protected position, the
ALI membership voted narrowly to strike tobacco from the list of examples of generically
dangerous products for which manufacturers are not subject to claims for defective design.
American Law Institute, 74 A.L.I. PROC. 169, 209-10 (1997); OWEN, supra note 8, § 8.8;
AL! Membership Grants Final Approval to Influential Product Liability Treatise, 25 Prod.
Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 2 1, at 509 (May 23, 1997); Daniel Givelber, Cigarette Law,
73 IND. L.J. 867, 870-71 (1998); see generally James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski,
Achieving Consensus on Defective Product Design, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 867, 905-08
(1998). Cigarette litigation is discussed infra Part II(B).
21 See, e.g., Jones, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 1248-50. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS § 2 cmt. d (1998) (recognizing that "courts generally have concluded that
legislatures and administrative agencies can, more appropriately than courts, consider the
desirability ofcommercial distribution of some categories ofwidely used and consumed, but
nevertheless dangerous, products").
2 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. d (1998); OWEN, supra note 8, § 6.2.
27 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2, reporter's note (IV)(D) (containing a
section entitled "Rejection by a Majority of Jurisdictions ofLiability Based on Nondefective
Products That Are Nevertheless Egregiously Dangerous").
28 Id. cmt. e.
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to use, or to allow children to use, the product. '29 This category of
egregiously dangerous products is at once both narrow and open-ended,
and it might fairly include such products as toy guns that shoot hard pellets
at high velocity,3" exploding novelty cigars,31 lawn darts,32 and clothing
made of highly flammable fabrics.3 3 While it may be that such products
should be banned altogether by legislatures or administrative safety
agencies (as they sometimes are), it seems self-evident that courts should
allow products liability claims by persons injured by products that in fact
can be proven to produce far more harm than good.34 Yet, the list of such
products should be short, including only those products that courts can
confidently say possess far greater risk than utility, such that they probably
should not be sold at all. Moreover, courts should be wary of allowing such
claims to go to the jury, and often should bar such claims as a matter of
law.35
II. PARTICULAR PRODUCTS
As commentators have debated the desirability of a broad or narrow
judicial role in cases involving design liability for generic product risks, the
29 id.
3 See id.
"Id. cmt. e, illus. 5.
3 See, e.g., Aimone v. Walgreen's Co., 601 F. Supp. 507, 509 (N.D. 111. 1985). Lawn
darts were long ago banned by the Consumer Product Safety Commission. See Owen, supra
note 21, at 127.
33 See, e.g., Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Haw. 1961) (involving bums from
a hula skirt that caught fire), aff'd, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962); Abels v. Murjani Int'l,
Ltd., Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 11,229 (D. Kan. 1986) (involving a blouse that caught fire
and caused injury); Carter v. Joseph Bancroft & Sons, 360 F. Supp. 1103, 1105 (E.D. Pa.
1973) (discussing an incident in which a woman's dress caught fire, causing her serious
injury); LaGorga v. Kroger Co., 275 F. Supp. 373, 375 (W.D. Pa. 1967) (arising from a
jacket which ignited, burning the minor plaintiff), aff'd 407 F.2d 671 (3d Cir. 1969). Note,
however, that flame retardants often can reduce the flammability of fabrics so that excessive
flammability is not an unavoidable hazard. See, e.g., id. at 380; Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson
Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn. 1980). See generally Dix W. Noel, Manufacturer's
Negligence of Design orDirectionsfor Use of a Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816, 844-45 (1962).
14 See David G. Owen, The Graying of Products Liability Law: Paths Taken and
Untaken in the New Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1241, 1253-57 (1994).
31 See Jones v. Amazing Prods., Inc., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1248-51 (N.D. Ga. 2002)
(granting summary judgment in favor of manufacturer of drain cleaner containing 97%
sulfuric acid).
2004-2005]
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courts have been busy handling expanding dockets involving various types
of inherent dangers litigation. Alcohol, cigarettes, and firearms might be
singled out as the prototypical objects of such litigation, containing
inherent risks that victims have sought to shift judicially to manufacturers.
Some types of products generate very little litigation, but might still be
classified as inherently dangerous, e.g., marshmallows, peanut butter, snow
sleds, jungle gyms, bullet-proof vests, and aluminum baseball bats.36
Other products, like ladders or trampolines,37 are dangerous enough to
trigger substantial litigation.3 8 Finally, some products have dangers that are
so substantial and widespread that they have spawned a multitude of
lawsuits around the nation, e.g., various prescription drugs, asbestos, lead
paint, and, most recently, fast foods. 9 With the exception of fast-food
litigation, which has just recently appeared on the judicial landscape,4" a
court or lawyer confronting such litigation can typically draw from an
enormous body of case law and commentary in each particular area. 1
Judicial decisions in cases involving the liability of manufacturers of
generically dangerous products, such as those described above, involve a
panoply of complex substantive and procedural issues. Only rarely do
courts address the underlying social welfare question of whether such a
36 See, e.g., Linegar v. Armour of Am., Inc., 909 F.2d 1150 (8th Cir. 1990) (applying
Missouri law in a case involving a bullet proof vest); Fraust v. Swift & Co., 610 F. Supp.
711 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (involving a case in which a child choked on peanut butter); Sanchez
v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529, 706-07 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (involving
a suit against a baseball bat manufacturer); Cozzi v. N. Palos Elementary Sch. Dist., 597
N.E.2d 683, 710 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (involving a child injured on a jungle gym); Emery v.
Federated Foods, Inc., 863 P.2d 426 (Mont. 1993) (discussing an incident of a child choking
on a marshmallow); Jordon v. K-Mart Corp., 611 A.2d 1328 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)
(discussing a sledding accident).
" See, e.g., Anderson v. Hedstrom Corp., 76 F. Supp. 2d 422, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1999);
Sollami v. Eaton, 772 N.E.2d 215, 217 (Ill. 2002).
38 See, e.g., Hoeft v. Louisville Ladder Co., 904 S.W.2d 298 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995)
(involving an aluminum ladder that hit a power line); Fayerweather v. Menard, Inc., 659
N.W.2d 506, 2 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003).
3' For a discussion on prescription drugs, see OWEN, supra note 8, at sections 8.10 and
9.6, and infra notes 147-50 and accompanying text. Concerning asbestos, lead paint, and
fast foods, see infra notes 151-91 and accompanying text.
" See Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 543 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(dismissing claims), vacatedin part by 396 F.3d 508 (2d Cir. 2005); Pelman v. McDonald's
Corp., No. 02 Civ. 7821, 2003 WL 22052778, at *14, 15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2003)
(dismissing complaint and denying leave to amend), vacated in part by 396 F.3d 508 (2d
Cir. Jan. 25, 2005).
" See supra note 39.
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product may be characterized as defective (in design) because its global
injury costs exceed its global social benefits. Occasionally, however, courts
do address issues of personal autonomy that often lie close to the heart of
these cases. Concepts of free choice and individual responsibility support
the idea that consumers who choose to accept the benefits of an obviously
and unavoidably dangerous product must also accept responsibility for the
product's risks as well. This powerful ideal finds doctrinal expression in
the consumer expectations test of product defectiveness and in rules that
impose on the user an assumption of risk or, alternatively, absolve the
manufacturer of its duty to wam of commonly known dangers. More often,
however, it lies hidden below discussions of unrelated legal doctrines.
Embedded to some extent in the rules of products liability law,42 personal
responsibility is surely the reason why plaintiffs have had so little success
convincing courts and juries that cigarette manufacturers should pay for the
hundreds of thousands of American smokers who die each year.
The following discussion highlights a number of recurring issues that
have arisen in litigation concerning several types of products notorious for
their substantial inherent hazards. As discussed below, although most of the
litigation involving generically dangerous products has been brought by
private plaintiffs (individually and in class action lawsuits), such claims are
increasingly being instituted by cities, states, and national governments.
A. Alcoholic Beverages
While alcoholic beverages provide widespread pleasure and relaxation,
they also wreak widespread harm. Alcoholism, cirrhosis and other diseases,
birth defects, car accidents, family discord, and violence are all too
frequently the direct results of alcohol consumption.43 Put simply, "water
" See David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law: Toward
First Principles, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 427 (1993).
43 See AM. LAW OF PRODS. LIAB. 3D § 83:1 (2004); Louis R. FRUMER & MELVIN I.
FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 12.07 (2004); PAUL LEBEL, JOHN BARLEYCORN MUST
PAY-COMPENSATING THE VICTIMS OF DRINKING DRIVERS (1992); GEORGE E. VAILLANT,
THE NATURAL HISTORY OF ALCOHOLISM (1983); Robert F. Cochran, From Cigarettes to
Alcohol: The Next Step in Hedonic Product Liability?, 27 PEPP. L. REV. 701, 701 (2000);
Constance Holden, Probing the Complex Genetics of Alcoholism, 251 AM. ASS'N FOR
ADVANCEMENT OF SC. 163 (Jan. 11, 1991); AntoniaNovello, Underage Drinking-A Report
from the Inspector General, 268 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 961, 961 (1992); Wayne J. Carroll,
Note, One Last Attempt at Liabilityfor "Vice" Products: A Different Ending to the "Willie
Story" Story?, 99 COM. L.J. 108 (1994); Natalie K. Chetlin, Comment, In Support of Hon
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is best."' Although one might plausibly argue that the social costs of
alcohol consumption exceed the social benefits, the courts and the
Restatements reject this macro-balance, risk-utility reasoning because the
dangers of alcoholic beverages are inherent, unavoidable, and widely
known. Indeed, almost all adults know and understand, at least generally,
the serious risks that can result from the excessive consumption of alcohol.
Accordingly, and because over-consumption is plainly product misuse,
45
ordinary alcoholic beverages cannot reasonably be viewed as defective.
The unavoidability of alcohol's inherent dangers, is highlighted in two
comments to section 402A of the Second Restatement. Comment i uses
alcoholic beverages as a paradigmatic example of how products that
contain commonly known dangers cannot be classified as "unreasonably
dangerous." Noting that "any food or drug necessarily involves some risk
of harm, if only from over-consumption," comment i declares that the strict
liability doctrine only applies to a product that is "dangerous to an extent
beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to
its characteristics. Good whiskey is not unreasonably dangerous merely
because it will make some people drunk, and is especially dangerous to
alcoholics . "..."46 The Third Restatement preserves this safe harbor for
alcoholic beverages. 7 In addition, manufacturers do not have a duty to
warn consumers about the dangers of drinking alcoholic beverages in
v. Stroh Brewery Co.: A Brewing Debate Over Extending Liability to Manufacturers of
Alcoholic Beverages, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 197 (1989); Rhondetta Goble, Note, FetalAlcohol
Syndrome: Liabilityfor Failure to Warn-ShouldLiquor Manufacturers Pick Up the Tab?,
28 J. FAM. L. 71 (1990); Janet R. Pritchett, Note, Texas Supreme Court Refuses to Impose
a Duty to Warn ofAlcoholism Upon Beverage Alcohol Manufacturers: Joseph E. Seagram
& Sons, Inc. v. McGuire, 22 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 937 (1991); Francis M. Dougherty,
Annotation, Products Liability: Alcoholic Beverages, 42 A.L.R. 4TH 253 (1985).
14 Clay Campbell, Note, Liability ofAlcoholic Beverage Manufacturers: No Longer a
Pink Elephant, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 157, 157 (1989) (citing Pindor, Olympian Odes as
quoted in THE NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 10 (1986)).
" This is despite the fact that alcohol misuse is foreseeable and, hence, falls outside the
conventional definition of this "defense." See OWEN, supra note 8, § 13.5.
46 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965); see also Bruner v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1360 (S.D. Fla. 2001), aff'd, 31 Fed. App. 932
(11 th Cir. 2002).
41 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. d (1998).
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excess because these dangers are already widely known.4s
Commentj in section 402A of the Second Restatement provides that a
seller does not have a duty to wam with respect to products that are
dangerous only "when consumed in excessive quantity, or over a long
period of time, when the danger, or potentiality of danger, is generally
known and recognized. Again the dangers of alcoholic beverages are an
example.. . ."' The Third Restatement provides, in commentj to section
2, that sellers need not wam about risks "that should be obvious to, or
generally known by, foreseeable product users."5 Accordingly, most
decisions have held that manufacturers of uncontaminated alcoholic
beverages simply are not subject to liability in negligence, implied
warranty, or strict liability for harm from their consumption." However, a
couple of courts,52 supported by some commentators,53 have reasonably
48 See, e.g., Bruner, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 1360 (noting "the 'universal recognition of all
potential dangers associated with alcohol"'); Pemberton v. Am. Distilled Spirits Co., 664
S.W.2d 690, 693 (Tenn. 1984); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. McGuire, 814 S.W.2d
385, 388 (Tex. 1991) ("From ancient times, the danger of alcoholism from prolonged and
excessive consumption of alcoholic beverages has been widely known and recognized.");
Morris v. Adolph Coors Co., 735 S.W.2d 578, 583 (Tex. App. 1987) ("The ordinary
consumer in today's society... knows of the dangers of driving while intoxicated.").
'9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1965).
0 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmtj (1998).
5' See, e.g., Garrison v. Heublein, Inc., 673 F.2d 189 (7th Cir. 1982) (applying Illinois
law and finding no liability for physical and mental injuries from consumption of Smirnoff
vodka over 20 years); Maguire v. Pabst Brewing Co., 387 N.W.2d 565 (Iowa 1986) (denying
recovery against a brewer for injuries from an automobile collision caused by a driver drunk
on Pabst beer); Pemberton, 664 S.W.2d at 690 (finding no duty under the Tennessee
Products Liability Act to warn of dangers of grain alcohol that would be apparent to an
ordinary user); Seagram, 814 S.W.2d at 388 (holding that there is no duty to warn of risk
of developing alcoholism from prolonged and excessive consumption of alcoholic
beverages); Morris, 735 S.W.2d at 583 (dismissing claims against manufacturer stemming
from a car accident caused by a driver drunk on beer).
52 See Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co., 835 F.2d 510, 511, 515-16 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding
that the question of whether the risk of death from pancreatitis caused by long-term
moderate beer consumption is a known danger to the general public is a triable issue of fact);
Brune v. Brown Forman Corp., 758 S.W.2d 827, 828-29 (Tex. App. 1988) (dealing with the
risk of death to a co-ed from acute alcohol poisoning as a result of chugging tequila).
53 See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 44, at 159; Diana D'Amico, A Spirited Call to
Require Alcohol Manufacturers to Warn of the Dangerous Propensities of Their Products,
11 NOVA L. REv. 1611, 1612 (1987) ("[H]olding alcohol manufacturers liable for injuries
and deaths caused by their products is both desirable and logical."); Carter H. Dukes,
Alcohol Manufacturers and the Duty to Warn: An Analysis ofRecent Case Law in Light of
the Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act of 1988, 38 EMORY L.J. 1189, 1205-06 (1989)
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concluded that manufacturers should have a duty to warn of the
lesser-known dangers of alcohol consumption, such as the risk of death
from diseases other than liver disease or from a single act of
over-consumption.54 However, now that the duty to warn is mandated by
federal statute, most warnings claims would appear to be barred by the
doctrine of federal preemption,55 and may also be precluded by the
inherent-risk provision of a state reform act. Both of these possibilities are
discussed below. For all of these reasons, it is safe to conclude that,
generally, manufacturers of alcoholic beverages are not liable for injuries
resulting from their consumption.5 6
B. Cigarettes
1. In general
Few products pose health risks as significant to the nation and to the
world as cigarettes. Presently, some fifty million Americans are smokers,
(concluding that "the Restatement's use of alcohol as an example of a product in which all
of its dangers are common knowledge is out of step with medical advancement" and
approving Hon, 835 F.2d 510, and Brune, 758 S.W.2d 827); Chetlin, supra note 43, at 181
(1989) (noting Hon, 835 F.2d 510, approvingly); Pritchett, supra note 43, at 955, 963-64
(noting Seagram, 814 S.W.2d 385, disapprovingly).
54 Another risk that still may not be fully appreciated, warned of by the Surgeon
General, is the risk of fetal alcohol syndrome caused by alcohol consumption during
pregnancy, which may cause birth defects in the brain, nervous system, heart, limb, and face.
See 16 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 11 (Jan. 1, 1988); Goble, supra note 43.
As discussed below, the Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act now requires a general warning
of this risk. See infra Part Ill(B).
" See, e.g., Dukes, supra note 53, at 1209 (discussing the preemption of state common
law causes of action). But see George Arthur Davis, Note, The Requisite Specificity of
Alcoholic Beverage WarningLabels: A Decision Best Leftfor Congressional Determination,
18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 943, 944-45 (1990). See generally OWEN, supra note 8, § 14.4.
56 The proposition is limited to a general one to allow room for claims of contamination
and fraudulent advertising. See Dukes, supra note 53, at 1190-91. The courts have been
unreceptive to deceptive advertising claims based on conventional "good life" advertising.
Bruner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2001), aff'd, 31
Fed.App. 932 (11th Cir. 2002); Overton v. Anheuser-Busch Co., 517 N.W.2d 308, 309
(Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (Bud Lite ads showing "fantasies coming to life, fantasies involving
a tropical setting, and beautiful women and men engaged in unrestricted merriment" were
merely puffs, not false statements of fact); cf Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. McGuire, 814
S.W.2d 385, 388 (Tex. 1991) (holding that manufacturer had no duty to warn of danger of
developing alcoholism); Morris, 735 S.W.2d at 583.
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and each year over 400,000 of these individuals, and as many as 4.5 million
others globally, die from lung cancer, heart disease, and other
tobacco-related illnesses.57 In the late 1990s and early 2000s, litigation
against tobacco manufacturers-including the state health care expense
recoupment cases that resulted in a $246 billion settlement between the
states and the tobacco industry,5" and a $145 billion punitive damages
verdict in a smoker class action suit in Florida, 9 which was later reversed 0
-figured among the most high-profile products liability litigation in
America.61
During the early 1900s, when products liability law was in its infancy,
little thought was given to holding manufacturers of cigarettes liable for the
illnesses their products might cause. Indeed, during the 1930s
manufacturers advertised some cigarettes as "harmless" and even
"healthful."62 As the years progressed, however, knowledge mounted about
the harmful effects of cigarette smoking. By the 1950s, when about half of
all American adults were smokers,63 studies had begun to establish a clear
link between cigarettes and disease.' Public disclosure of this connection
promptly led to a ten percent drop in cigarette consumption over a two-year
" See Wertheimer, supra note 8, at 1454 n.59 (1994) (reporting that cigarette smoking
is responsible for 450,000 deaths in the U.S. per year); see also Gilbert J. Birnbrich, Forcing
Round Classes Into Square Rules: Attempting Certification ofNicotineAddiction-as-Injury
Class Actions Under FederalRule of Civil Procedure 23(B)(3), 29 U. TOL. L. REv. 699,699
(1998); Alison Langley, US. to Support World Tobacco-Control Treaty, N.Y. TIMES, May
18, 2003, at A3 (citing national figure and World Health Organization estimate of 4.9
million annual cigarette deaths around the world, a number it predicts will double over the
next 20 years).
58 This litigation is discussed infra notes 98-105 and accompanying text..
'9 Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle, 853 So. 2d 434, 442, 470 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003),
reh 'g en banc denied, 2003 Fla. Dist. Ct. App. LEXIS 14774 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 22,
2003); cf R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39, 42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
(upholding class certification).
6
oLiggett, 853 So. 2d at 470. The Florida Supreme Court has granted review. See Grele
v. Liggett Group, Inc. 873 So. 2d 1222 (2004).
61 See Ellen Wertheimer, Pandora's Humidor: Tobacco Producer Liability in Tort, 24
N. Ky. L. REv. 397, 422 & n.4 (1997); Wertheimer, supra note 8, at 1449.
62 See, e.g., Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 296-97 (3d Cir.
1961) (applying Pennsylvania law); Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 234 F.2d 464,
466 (1st Cir. 1956) (Magruder, J., concurring) (applying Massachusetts law).
63 See ROBERT L. RABIN, REGULATING TOBACCO 176 (Robert Rabin & Stephen
Sugarman eds., 2001).
4 See Daniel Givelber, supra note 24, at 889.
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period, spurring the tobacco industry to hire a public relations firm to help
it combat the growing concern over cigarettes and health.65 The consultants
advised the industry to attack the issue head-on by creating an ostensibly
independent organization, the Tobacco Industry Research Committee, for
the purpose of studying the relationship of tobacco smoking and disease.
From this point forward, the industry's message to smokers was united,
plain, and unequivocal: cigarettes did not cause cancer.6
As products liability litigation began to accelerate during the 1960s, the
cigarette industry sought legal cover. Two important developments in this
decade served to construct a strong fortress around the tobacco industry for
most of the remainder of the twentieth century. The first of these was the
inclusion of tobacco in the safe harbor provided by the Second Restatement
for certain inherently dangerous products. 7 Second, federal labeling
legislation mandated that cigarette manufacturers place Surgeon General
warnings about smoking hazards on its cigarette packages, a decision that
provided the industry with both an iron-clad assumption of risk defense
and a defense based on federal preemption.6"
2. Tobacco Litigation
Tobacco litigation, long the subject of scholarly debate,69 has been
divided into three waves: the first, from 1954 to the 1960s or early 1970s;
the second, from the early 1980s to the early 1990s; and the third,
65 Id.; see Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44
STAN. L. REv. 853, 858 (1992).
6 See Givelber, supra note 24; see also Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 48 P.3d 824,
833 & n.9 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) (reviewing the history of cigarette marketing), vacated by 540
U.s. 801 (2003).
67 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965).
68Givelber, supra note 24, at 889-90. The Supreme Court's holding on the preemptive
effect of the legislation is examined in David G. Owen, Federal Preemption of Products
Liability Claims, 55 S.C. L. REv. 411,413-14 (2003).
69 For example, see Paul A. LeBel & Richard C. Ausness, Toward Justice in Tobacco
Policymaking: A Critique of Hanson and Logue and an Alternative Approach to the Costs
of Cigarettes, 33 GA. L. REV. 693 (1999) (suggesting that moral theory recommends
imposing an excise tax on cigarettes and allowing industry immunity from tort liability
except for fraud), critiquing Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The
Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163 (1998)
(proposing that economic theory suggests strict tort liability and an administrative smokers'
compensation program).
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beginning in the early to mid-1990s and continuing to the present.7° In the
first wave, plaintiffs' claims for negligence, breach of warranty, 7' and
deceit were hampered by the absence of substantial scientific evidence
linking smoking with disease. Sparing no expense in their tenacious
defense of each case, tobacco lawyers consistently emerged victorious.72 In
the second wave of litigation, plaintiffs often had considerably better
scientific evidence relating to causation, but their strict liability design and
warnings claims were usually thwarted by section 402A comment i's safe
haven for tobacco and the assumption-of-the-risk argument.73 The tobacco
70 See, e.g., AM. LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 3D § 88.20 (2004); 5 FRUMER &
FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, § 56.01(3)-(5) (2002); RABIN, supra note 63; G. SCHWARTZ,
TOBACCO LIABLiTY tN THE COURTS, IN SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE
(Robert Rabin & Stephen Sugarman eds., 1992) (describing the first and second waves);
Richard L. Cupp, Jr., A Morality Play's Third Act. Revisiting Addiction, Fraud, and
Consumer Choice in "Third Wave" Tobacco Litigation, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 465, 465
(1998); Richard A. Daynard, The Third Wave of Tobacco Products Liability Cases, 30 TRIAL
34 (Nov. 1992); Marc Z. Edell, Cigarette Litigation: The Second Wave, 22 TORT & INS. L.J.
90, 90 (1986); Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., A Primer on Cigarette Litigation Under the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 27 Sw. U. L. REV. 487 (1998); Graham E.
Kelder & Richard A. Daynard, The Role ofLitigation in the Effective Control of the Sale and
Use of Tobacco, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 63, 71 (1997); Paul A. LeBel, "Of Deaths Put on
by Cunning and Forced Cause ". Reality Bites the Tobacco Industry, 38 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 605, 647 (1997); Rabin, supra note 65, at 874; Christa Sarafa, Making Tobacco
Companies Pay: The Florida Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH
CARE L. 123, 127-32 (1997); Marcia L. Stein, Cigarette Products Liability Law in
Transition, 54 TENN. L. REV. 631, 631 (1987) (discussing the first wave); Frank J. Vandall,
The Legal Theory and the Visionaries that Led to the Proposed $368.5 Billion Tobacco
Settlement, 27 Sw. U. L. REV. 473, 473-76 (1998); Ed Dawson, Note, Legigation, 79 TEX.
L. REV. 1727, 1729-30 (2001).
"' On the implied warranty of merchantability in cigarette litigation, see Franklin E.
Crawford, Note, Fit for Its Ordinary Purpose?: Tobacco, Fast Food, and the Implied
Warranty of Merchantability, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1165 (2002).
72 See, e.g., Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3, 4-5, 31 (8th Cir. 1964). See
generally Bimbrich, supra note 57, at 700.
73
[Tihe most salient theme in the second wave litigation has been freedom of choice
.... [T]obacco litigation is a last vestige of a perhaps idealized vision of
nineteenth century tort law as an interpersonal morality play. The sophisticated
plaintiffs' lawyers... counted on the advent of comparative fault, buttressed by
their ability to depict a socially irresponsible industry overpromoting a highly
dangerous product, to counter-or, at least, blunt-the personal choice argument.
In doing so,... they simply failed to grasp how intensely most jurors would react
to damage claims by individuals who were aware of the risks associated with
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lawyers fought on, relentlessly outspending every plaintiffs lawyer and
winning every case.74
Prior to the third wave of litigation, the tobacco industry was an
"impenetrable fortress,"75 litigating relentlessly and boasting that it had
never paid a dime in damages in the hundreds of lawsuits it had defended
since the 1950s.76 In the third wave, spurred largely by new revelations of
misleading and manipulative conduct on the part of the tobacco industry,
the industry's fortunes began to change. First, after several years in the
lower courts, the Supreme Court in 1992 decided the carefully prosecuted
case of Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.7 7 Although the Cipollone Court
ruled that the congressionally mandated cigarette warnings preempted the
plaintiffs' warnings claims, it also held that certain other claims (such as
design defectiveness, breach ofexpress warranty, and fraud) fell outside the
preemptive reach of the federal labeling act.7" Then, in 1994, documents
and testimony provided by two whistle-blowers revealed stark new
evidence on the industry's conspiracy to deceive the public about the
smoking and nonetheless chose to continue the activity over a long time period.
Rabin, supra note 65, at 870-71.
" See, e.g., Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Co., 849 F.2d 230, 236 (6th Cir. 1988); Rogers
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 745 N.E.2d 793, 796 (Ind. 2001) (affirming trial court
judgment on verdict for defendant in case initiated in 1980s). See generally Birnbrich, supra
note 57, at 700, 700-01; Rabin, supra note 65, at 867-68 (1992) (detailing the tobacco
industry's "no-holds-barred defense of every claim"). "As a tobacco industry lawyer would
put it, . . . the industry's hardball tactics made the litigation 'extremely burdensome and
expensive for plaintiffs' lawyers .... To paraphrase Gen. [George] Patton, the way we won
these cases was not by spending all of Reynolds' money, but by making [the enemy] spend
all of his."' Id. at 868.
"' Lori Ann Luka, Note, The Tobacco Industry and the First Amendment, An Analysis
of the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement, 14 J. L. & HEALTH 297, 298 (2000).
76 See Bimbrich, supra note 57, at 700 (noting that tobacco companies have "yet to pay
a single dollar to a plaintiff"); Cupp, supra note 70, at 468 n. 17 (stating that the industry by
then had prevailed in over 800 lawsuits); Rabin, supra note 65, at 874 (noting that after
thirty-five years of litigation, the tobacco industry had paid out not "a cent"). But see Jeffrey
J. Rachlinski, Regulating in Foresight Versus Judging Liability in Hindsight: The Case of
Tobacco, 33 GA. L. REV. 813, 813 (1999) (stating that no longer can the industry say that
it has paid not "one dime" in damages).
7 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
7 Id. at 519-20; cf Owen, supra note 8, § 14.4 (discussing the intricacies of federal
preemption).
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hazards of smoking and, in particular, the addictive qualities of nicotine.7 9
As early as 1963, for example, one of the industry's top lawyers observed
that "[w]e are, then, in the business of selling nicotine, an addictive
product."8 These revelations, combined with increasing public antipathy
toward "Big Tobacco," prompted the plaintiffs' bar, newly enriched from
the coffers of the (former) asbestos industry, to pool their resources and
aggressively begin the third round of litigation that has continued to this
day.
In the post-Cipollone world, though plaintiffs continue to lose many
cases,8 lower courts have allowed claims for negligence, design
defectiveness, 2 fraud, conspiracy, and failure to wam prior to the 1966
federal labeling act.83 A recurring defense in third-wave litigation is that
79 Both whistleblowers had worked for Brown & Williamson--one was a paralegal at
the company's defense law firm who copied internal documents prior to his dismissal, and
the other was the head of research and development for the company, fired after years of
contention over the company's failure to responsibly address the perils of tobacco. See
RABIN, supra note 63, at 183-85.
8Id. at 184.
81 See, e.g., Hughes v. Tobacco Inst., Inc., 278 F.3d 417,426 (5th Cir. 2001) (applying
Texas "inherently unsafe product" defense); Glassner v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 223
F.3d 343, 354 (6th Cir. 2000) (applying Ohio law); Allgood v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
80 F.3d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 1996) (applying Texas law); Lacey v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 956
F. Supp. 956, 964 (N.D. Ala. 1997); Toole v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 980 F.
Supp. 419,426 (N.D. Ala. 1997); Sonnenreich v. Philip Morris, Inc., 929 F. Supp. 416,420
(S.D. Fla. 1996); Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 852 F. Supp. 8, 11 (E.D. La. 1994),
aff'd, 52 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 1995).
12 Claims that cigarettes are defectively designed because they cause lung cancer and
other diseases must confront the fact that the risks of nicotine are unavoidable: such
problems are a generic risk of cigarette smoking that seem impossible to remove without
removing the pleasure (including the satisfaction of an addiction) people receive from
smoking. The broader generic risk issue treated earlier is addressed in terms of design
defectiveness in OWEN, supra note 8, § 8.8.
03 See, e.g., Boerner v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 260 F.3d 837, 849 (8th
Cir. 2001) (discussing design defect and pre-1966 warnings); Tompkin v. Am. Brands, 219
F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2000) (applying Ohio law to case involving implied warranty; design
defect and pre-1965 failure to warn); Insolia v. Philip Morris, Inc., 216 F.3d 596, 598 (7th
Cir. 2000) (applying Wisconsin law in negligence case); Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 205 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1265 (D. Kan. 2002) (involving negligent testing and research,
failure to wam, and fraudulent concealment of addictive nature), affd in part and rev'd in
part, 397 F.3d 906 (10th Cir. 2005); Wright v. Brooke Group Ltd., 114 F. Supp. 2d 797, 838
(N.D. Iowa 2000) (involving strict liability and negligence); Cantley v. Lorillard Tobacco,
Co., 681 So. 2d 1057, 1062 (Ala. 1996) (involving design defect); Wright v. Brooke Group
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the dangers of smoking were common knowledge. Although this defense
succeeded in some courts,84 it has been roundly rejected by others on the
grounds of "moral estoppel";"5 that is, knowing the general hazards of
smoking does not amount to knowing that it can cause particular diseases
or that it can be highly addictive, and the user's awareness of a product
risk, rather than being dispositive, is merely one factor in a risk-utility
analysis of defectiveness.8 6 On convincing evidence of fraud and con-
spiracy, a few juries have returned substantial verdicts, comprised mostly
Ltd., 652 N.W.2d 159, 182 (Iowa 2002) (discussing fraud, design defect, and civil
conspiracy, and answering certified questions as to the requirements of such claims);
Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 48 P.3d 824, 842 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) (involving fraud),
vacated by 124 S.Ct. 56 (2003); see also Naegele v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 50 P.3d
769, 774 (Cal. 2002) (finding that the immunity statute only barred claims for "inherent"
risks in companies' product and so did not bar claims that companies fraudulently
adulterated cigarettes by increasing their nicotine content); Myers v. Philip Morris Co., 50
P.3d 751, 763 (Cal. 2000) (holding that the state's tobacco immunity statute enacted in 1987
and repealed in 1997 does not bar claims with respect to tobacco company conduct before
or after ten-year immunity period).
4 E.g., Glassner, 223 F.3d at 353-54; Sanchez v. Liggett & Meyers, Inc., 187 F.3d 486,
491 (5th Cir. 1999); Allgood, 80 F.3d at 172 (applying Texas law); see also Insolia, 216
F.3d at 602-03, 608 (holding that because smokers probably understood health risks of
smoking, including fact that it is habit-forming, when they began smoking in 1935 and early
1950s, their strict liability claims were precluded under the consumer expectations test);
Toole, 980 F. Supp. at 425-26 (holding that the federal labeling act does not apply to loose
tobacco used for rolling cigarettes and that there was no duty to warn of obvious hazards).
85
If there were such a thing as moral estoppel, the outcome of this appeal would be
plain. For decades tobacco companies have assured the public that there is nothing
to fear from cigarettes, yet they now slough off lawsuits like this one by professing
that everybody knew all along that smoking was risky.
Insolia, 216 F.3d at 598.
86 See, e.g., Tompkin, 219 F.3d at 572 (applying Ohio law):
The pertinent issue here is not whether the public knew that smoking was
hazardous to health at some undifferentiated level, but whether it knew of the
specific linkages between smoking and lung cancer. Public awareness of a
broad-based and ambiguous risk that smoking might be tenuously connected to
lung cancer does not suggest "common knowledge" of the known scientific fact
that cigarette smoking is a strong precipitant of lung cancer.
Id.; see also Wright, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 810 (providing a thorough analysis of whether
various smoking claims were barred by common knowledge doctrine, and concluding that
because "there is a considerable difference between knowing that smoking is bad and
knowing that smoking is addictive," the risk of addiction is not a "lesser included risk" of
the risks of smoking); Wright, 652 N.W.2d at 170-71 (,answering certified questions).
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of punitive damages, with some favorable appellate results.8 7
Class action claims against the tobacco industry, however, have met
with limited success. In Castano v. American Tobacco Co., plaintiffs
brought a national class action which was certified by the trial court, but
reversed on appeal.8" Plaintiffs' counsel thereafter brought a large number
of state class actions, almost all of which eventually were lost. 9 R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle,9 ° a smoker's class action brought in
Florida, led to a spectacular verdict of approximately $145 billion,9 but the
judgment was reversed and the class decertified on appeal. 92 An Illinois
smoker class action for economic losses resulted in a verdict for $10.1
billion, but that case is presently on appeal. 93 In addition, Judge Weinstein
87 In a half century of litigation prior to the state settlements in the late 1990s, only three
smokers had ever prevailed in cigarette litigation, and two of those cases were reversed on
appeal. See OWEN, supra note 8, at 656 n.79. In the years following the 1998 state settlement
discussed below, individual smokers have won a number of cases. See, e.g., Burton, 205 F.
Supp. 2d at 1265 (assessing punitive damages of$15 million); Williams, 48 P.3d at 828,843
(discussing fraud and reinstating $79.5 million punitive damages verdict remitted by trial
court to $32.8 million); Henley v. Philip Morris, Inc., 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 42, 86 (Cal. Ct. App.
2003) (remitting further a punitive damages award, which had been previously remitted by
the trial court from $50 million, to $25 million, to $9 million); Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc.,
No. BC 226593, 2001 WL 1894403, at *15 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2001) (remitting $3
billion punitive damages verdict to $100 million), aff'das modifiedby 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 101
(Cal. Ctr. App. 2004); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Kenyon, 826 So. 2d 370, 371-72, 374
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (agreeing to hear appeal concerning a $165,000 compensatory
award).
" Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544,560-61 (E.D. La. 1995), rev 'd 83 F.3d
734, 737 (5th Cir. 1996); see RABIN, supra note 63, at 179-89.
" E.g., Estate of Mahoney v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 204 F.R.D. 150, 161 (S.D.
Iowa 2001) (denying certification of class of Iowa smokers). See generally RABIN, supra
note 63, at 188. The lawsuits were grounded in theories developed in Raymond E.
Gangarosa et al., Suits by Public Hospitals to Recover Expenditures for the Treatment of
Disease, Injury andDisability Caused by Tobacco andAlcohol, 22 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 81
(1994).
90 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39, 42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
(upholding certification of 300,000 to 700,000 Florida smokers suffering from tobacco
diseases); RABIN, supra note 63, at 188. See generally Andrew J. Soltes, Jr., Milking the
Tobacco Cash Cow Dry, 18 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 201 (2001).
9' RABIN, supra note 63, at 188.
92 Liggett Group Inc. v. Engle, 853 So. 2d 434, 470 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003), reh 'g
en bancdenied, 2003 Fla. Dist. Ct. App. LEXIS 14774 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2003).
"3 Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., 793 N.E.2d 942, 945, 947, 951 (111. App. Ct. 2003)
(holding that a trial court verdict of $7.1 billion in compensatory damages and $3 billion in
punitive damages was error, and reducing $12 billion appeal bond); see also Vanessa
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of the United States District Court of New York has certified a class action
seeking punitive damages for fraud on behalf of most injured smokers in
the United States.94 A few claims have been brought for injuries allegedly
caused by second-hand smoke, with varying success.9' Additionally, at
least one proposed class action was filed (also in Florida) on behalf of users
of chewing tobacco who claim to have suffered various cancers from the
product.96
3. Litigation by States, Nations, and Insurers
Probably the most significant development in cigarette litigation thus
far was the tobacco industry's settlement of the health care reimbursement
claims brought by the states.97 During the mid-i 990s, the individual states,
beginning with Mississippi, sued the industry on a number of grounds,
including public nuisance, unjust enrichment, and restitution,9" to recoup
their accumulated Medicaid health care expenditures resulting from
tobacco use.99 In 1998, after pre-verdict settlements with Mississippi for
O'Connell, Altria Verdict Unleashes Worries, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 2002, at C 1.
" In re Simon II Litigation, 211 F.R.D. 86, 185-86 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (Weinstein, J.)
(certifying national tobacco class action seeking punitive damages for fraud).
95 See, e.g., Wolpin v. Philip Morris, Inc., 974 F. Supp. 1465, 1470-72 (S.D. Fla. 1997)
(denying motion to dismiss claims for failing to warn of dangers of second-hand smoke,
fraud, and civil conspiracy); Broin v. Philip Morris Co., 641 So. 2d 888, 892 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1994) (ordering trial court to certify flight attendant class action); Badillo v. Am.
Brands, Inc., 16 P.3d 435,441 (Nev. 2001) (involving a class of smokers and non-smokers
exposed to second-hand smoke and denying a claim for medical monitoring costs).
6 See Matthew Haggman, Tobacco Wars Are Going Smokeless, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 18,
2002, at A10.
" Richard C. Ausness, Public Tort Litigation: Public Benefit or Public Nuisance, 77
TEMP. L. REv. (forthcoming 2005); see RABIN, supra note 63, at 177; Appendix III -
Tobacco Settlement Summary, 2 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 167 (1998); Luka, supra note
75; Jack Ratliff, Parens Patriae: An Overview, 74 TUL. L. REv. 1847, 1854 (2000); cf
Thomas C. Galligan, A Primer on Cigarette Litigation Under the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability, 27 Sw. U. L. REv. 487 (1998); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Regulating
in Foresight Versus Judging Liability In Hindsight: The Case of Tobacco, 33 GA. L. REv.
813 (1999).
" Other claims include fraud, negligence, breach of warranty, strict liability in tort, and
antitrust and consumer protection statutory violations.
" E.g., Texas v. Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956, 960-61,974 (E.D. Tex. 1997)
(applying Texas law and allowing most claims), vacated in part by 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23289 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 1997); Am. Tobacco Co. v. State, 697 So. 2d 1249, 1256-57 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (discussing discovery matters); State v. Philip Morris Inc., 577 N.W.2d
401,403,406 (Iowa 1998) (affirming dismissal because the state's claims were too remote).
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$3.6 billion, Texas for $15.3 billion, Florida for $11.3 billion, and
Minnesota for $7.1 billion,00 the tobacco industry saw the futility of
continuing to fight the well-organized and well-funded state attorneys
general and plaintiffs' lawyers and negotiated a global settlement with the
states for a total of $246 billion, payable over 25 years.0 1
Following this highly successful tobacco litigation by the states, a
number of health insurers, welfare funds, and hospitals filed similar suits
seeking recompense of the costs they had incurred as a result of smokers'
health care expenses."' None ofthese claims were successful. "3 The courts
generally reasoned that the costs to these types of institutional plaintiffs
were too remote to give them standing to complain. In addition, in 1999 the
United States Department of Justice filed its own suit against the tobacco
industry 4 seeking disgorgement of $289 billion in unlawful profits that the
100 See Ausness, supra note 97 (describing each state's litigation). The total Minnesota
recovery was comprised of $6.6 billion for the state and $469 million for Blue Cross-Blue
Shield of Minnesota, which had joined in the suit.
"' This figure is comprised of the four state settlements of roughly $40 billion (also
payable over 25 years) together with a global settlement for the other 46 states plus the
District of Columbia and four territories, amounting to $206 billion, payable primarily from
2000 to 2025. RABIN, supra note 63, at 189-93; Ausness, supra note 97.
102 See, e.g., Regence Blueshield v. Philip Morris, Inc., 5 Fed. App. 651, 652-53 (9th
Cir. 2001) ("Their claimed damages were not proximately caused by the Tobacco Firms'
unlawful conduct, but were instead derivative of the personal injuries of smokers afflicted
by tobacco-related illnesses."); Serv. Employees Int'l Union Health & Welfare Fund v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 249 F.3d 1068, 1069, 1076 & n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that claims
were too remote and not proximate, and that the employment health care funds lacked
standing); Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429,423-33 (3d Cir. 2000)
(dismissing common law and RICO claims because the unreimbursed health care costs
incurred by the 16 hospital plaintiffs on behalf of indigent patients were too remote to satisfy
requirement ofproximate cause); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters Local 734 Health & Welfare Trust
Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 196 F.3d 818, 820, 824 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[S]mokers (and their
employers) pay for the medical costs, in advance, through higher insurance rates (or,
equivalently, lower wages in a medical-care-plus-wage compensation package. The Funds
and the Blues are just financial intermediaries."); Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare
Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912, 937 (3d Cir. 1999) (discussing remoteness and
proximate cause). See generally Gangarosa et al., supra note 89.
103 Id.
104 United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 9, 13 (D.D.C. 2004) (dismissing
defendants' summary judgment motion); United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 321 F. Supp.
2d 72, 82 (D.D.C. 2004). As of the time of this article in 2005, this case is still active. See
generally Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Seeks $289 Billion in Cigarette Makers 'Profits, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 17, 2003, at C l, ("[T]he Justice Department asserts in more than 1,400 pages of court
documents that the major cigarette companies are running what amounts to a criminal
enterprise by manipulating nicotine levels, lying to their customers about the dangers of
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tobacco industry garnered with over a half century of fraud and deceit.'05
Several foreign nations have also sued the tobacco industry for health
care costs resulting from tobacco-related diseases, but such cases have
been dismissed because the plaintiffs' damages were too remote to satisfy
the requirements of proximate cause and standing.'06 An entirely different
type of litigation by foreign nations and the European Community" 7
involves civil RICO 1 8 and tort law10 9 claims, which allege that certain
tobacco companies aided and abetted cigarette smuggling across their
borders, using black market operations typically associated with money
laundering, organized crime, and even terrorism.1 Such operations are
tobacco and directing their multibillion-dollar advertising campaigns at children.") In recent
filings, the Justice Department contends that the "defendants' scheme to defraud permeated
and influenced all facets of defendants' conduct-research, product development,
advertising, marketing, legal, public relations, and communications-in a manner that has
resulted in extraordinary profits for the past half-century, but has had devastating
consequences for the public's health." Id.
105 United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 131 (D.D.C. 2000) (allowing
RICO claim, but not others, to proceed); Lichtblau, supra note 104. A 1971 Philip Morris
research report purportedly refutes the industry's persistent denial of tobacco's addictive
qualities in its acknowledgment of the depression, irritability and "neurotic symptoms" that
can result from attempting to quit. The Justice Department's filings disclose that the cigarette
manufacturer's research report "mocked an antismoking commercial that depicted an
exuberant couple leaping for joy after they quit smoking" and that "[a] more appropriate
commercial would show a restless, nervous, constipated husband bickering viciously with
his bitchy wife who is nagging him about his slothful behavior and growing waistline." Id.
06 Compare Serv. Employees Int'l Union Health & Welfare Fund, 249 F.3d at 1076
(finding that claims by Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Ukraine were essentially derivative and
too remote, that damages were not proximate, and that defendants lacked standing), aff'g
Republic of Guatemala v. Tobacco Inst., Inc., 83 F. Supp. 2d 125 (D.D.C. 1999), with
Republic of Panama v. Am. Tobacco Co., 217 F.3d 343, 347-48 (5th Cir. 2000), (ordering
trial court judge recused). See also Brian S. Appel, Note, The Developing World Takes on
the Tobacco Industry, 16 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 809 (2001) (stating that the parens patriae
doctrine, unlike the remoteness doctrine, would allow proper claims by foreign
governments).
'07 See European Cmty. v. Japan Tobacco, Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 231, 233 (E.D.N.Y.
2002), vacated by 355 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2004).
108 The claims brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., alleged that the defendant tobacco companies engaged
in and directed a pattern of racketeering activity in conducting cigarette smuggling and
money laundering activities. European Cmty., 186 F. Supp. 2d at 233.
109The tort law claims alleged fraud, public nuisance, restitution for unjust enrichment,
negligence, and negligent misrepresentation. Id.
110 See 147 CONG. REC. Sl1, 028-29 (2001) (remarks of Sen. Kerry) ("Smuggling,
money laundering, and fraud against our allies are an important part of the schemes by which
terrorism is financed."); BAT and Tobacco Smuggling: Submission to the House of
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highly lucrative to manufacturers who want to keep their prices relatively
low by avoiding the sometimes steep cigarette taxes imposed by foreign
governments. As a result of these operations, the plaintiff nations (and the
E.U.) lose enormous tax revenues and must bear a variety of other costs,
including the cost of maintaining anti-smuggling forces, and the economic
and social costs of a sometimes violent criminal black market for
cigarettes.' 1
In the first such smuggling case to reach the courts, Attorney General
of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc.,12 a federal district
court dismissed Canada's case on the basis of the "revenue rule" and, in a
split decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed. The revenue rule is an archaic
doctrine first promulgated by the English courts in the 1700s for the
purpose of protecting the lucrative smuggling trade that British merchants
then controlled around the world under the protection of the British navy,
which ruled the seven seas." 3 In its present form, the revenue rule has
evolved into an abstention doctrine by which a court may choose whether
to hear a tax claim brought by a foreign government seeking recovery from
a foreign tax debtor under foreign law.' 14 Parochially perverse from its
inception, the revenue rule has been roundly criticized by modem courts
and commentators; and it is also an unseemly blight on American
Commons Health Select Committee, at http:// www.pm2.usm.my/mainsite/tobacco/
tinfo9.html (Feb. 14,2000); International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, Tobacco
Companies Linked to Criminal Organizations in Lucrative Cigarette Smuggling, at
http://www.corpwatch.org/issues/PID.jsp?articleid-898 (Mar. 3, 2001); David Merriman,
Understand, Measure, and Combat Tobacco Smuggling, in WORLD BANK EcONOMICS OF
TOBACCO TooLKrr 8-9 (Ayda Yurekli & Joy de Beyer eds.) (draft), at
http://www.worldbank.org/tobacco/pdf/Smuggling.pdf, WCRO-IPR Strategic Group,
Smuggling, Counterfeiting and Piracy: The Rising Tide of Contraband and Organized
Crime in Europe, athttp://www.wcoipr.org/wcoipr/default.htm?/wcoipr/Menu Alliance.htm
(Apr. 2001).
... See OWEN, supra note 8, at 659. These harms are in addition to the health care
problems from increased consumption due to the enhanced availability of cigarettes to
price-sensitive consumers at lower black market prices. Id. at n. 102.
"
2 Attorney Gen. of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d
134, 144 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (dismissing complaint alleging civil RICO violations and
common law fraud), aft'd, 268 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2001) (affirming the decision, 2 to 1). In
a powerful dissent, Judge Calabresi reasoned: "It is manifest that the suit before us in no way
requires our courts to enforce foreign judgments or claims; it simply is an action for damages
provided for and brought under federal law." 268 F.3d at 135.
"3 See OWEN, supra note 8, at 659.
14 See, e.g., Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 272, 274 (1935).
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jurisprudence, especially in a shrinking global environment where nations
must cooperate in deterring transnational criminal conspiracies hatched in,
directed from, and carried out in different nations."5 Despite its serious
flaws, the rule has been applied to steer clear of international disputes that
could enmesh American courts, if only indirectly, in enforcing the tax laws
of other nations. "
6
Although Canada was largely denounced by commentators," 7 it has
caused a couple of district judges to dismiss smuggling claims against
tobacco companies. Once such case involving a claim brought by
" See, e.g., European Cmty. v. Japan Tobacco, Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 231, 234
(E.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting criticism of rule), vacated by 355 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2004);
European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 2d 456, 472-86 (E.D.N.Y. 2001)
(examining basis for, defects in, and applicability of the rule); Banco Frances e Brasileiro,
S.A. v. John Doe, 331 N.E.2d 502, 505 (N.Y. 1975) (Jasen, J.) (finding that the revenue rule
is "justifiable neither precedentially nor analytically"); Casenote, Separation of
Powers-Foreign Affairs-Second Circuit Holds that the Revenue Rule Bars A Foreign
Sovereign 's CivilRICOSuitfor Tax Revenue-Attorney General ofCanada v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 115 HARv. L. REV. 2333, 2340 (2002) [hereinafter Separation of
Powers]. But see William S. Dodge, Breaking the Public Law Taboo, 43 HARv. INT'L L.J.
161 (2002) (arguing that the revenue rule is justified on policy grounds because, unlike other
branches of government, courts cannot ensure reciprocity in the enforcement of foreign tax
laws).
116 "The revenue rule is a longstanding common law doctrine providing that courts of
one sovereign will not enforce final tax judgments or unadjudicated tax claims of other
sovereigns. It has been defended on several grounds, including respect for sovereignty,
concern for judicial role and competence, and separation of powers." Attorney Gen. of
Canada, 268 F.3d at 109; see also Republic of Ecuador v. Philip Morris Co., 188 F. Supp.
2d 1359, 1363-64 (S.D. Fla. 2002), (quoting earlier American decisions approving revenue
rule), aft'd, 341 F.3d 1253 (11 th Cir. 2002). But see Milwaukee County, 296 U.S. at 272,
274 (1935); King of Spain v. Oliver, 14 F. Cas. 577 (D. Pa. 1810).
117 E.g., Jennine B. Mazzola, Attorney Gen. of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Holdings, Inc., 15 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 101, 107 (2002) (noting that the decision "ultimately
denied the legislative goal of the RICO act" inasmuch as the "court essentially permitted the
defendants to retain the profits they made illegally"); Elizabeth J. Farnam, Note,
Racketeering, RICO, and the Revenue Rule in Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds:
Civil RICO Claims for Foreign Tax Law Violations, 77 WASH. L. REV. 843, 844-45 (2002)
(stating that Canada "was wrongly decided" because the civil claim under RICO did not
raise separation of powers concerns, and the "court employed a novel expansion of the
revenue rule that impermissibly restricted the scope of RICO"); Separation ofPowers, supra
note 115, at 2340 ("The court's reliance on the revenue rule oversimplifies complex
questions of international policy and blunts the potential effectiveness of U.S. laws in
tackling sophisticated, modern problems like international smuggling and global tax
evasion."). But see Dodge, supra note 115, at 233-34 (concluding that Canada was correctly
decided on policy grounds).
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Ecuador,' and another more significant consolidated action was brought
by the Republic of Colombia, the European Community, and most of its
member states against certain cigarette manufacturers for smuggling,
money laundering, and related activities." 9 After the district court
dismissed most of their claims on the basis of Canada, the plaintiffs in
European Community refiled with an emphasis on the defendants' money
laundering, racketeering, and other tortious activities. The case was again
dismissed, and the dismissal was affirmed, with apparent finality.12
C. Firearms
1. Background
The menace of guns in American society, particularly handguns but
also various assault rifles, has spawned a morass of litigation and debate. 2'
1S Republic of Equador, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 1369.
19 European Cmty., 186 F. Supp. 2d at 245 (holding that the revenue rule required
dismissal of smuggling claims seeking lost tax revenue, but that the money laundering claims
seeking other types of damages were dismissed without prejudice to replead).
"20 European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 355 F.3d 123, 139 (2d Cir. 2004).
121 See FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at §§ 3.05, 12.07 (2002); Jill R.
Baniewicz, Note, Is Hamilton v. Accu-tek a Good Predictor of What the Future Holds for
Gun Manufacturers?, 34 IND. L. REV. 419 (2001) (discussing Hamilton v. Accu Tek, 62 F.
Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), vacated by 264 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 2001)); Dana David, Tort
Law: Handgun Manufacturer Liability, 9 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 764 (1986) (noting
Kelley v. R.G. Industries, 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985); Note, Handguns and Product
Liability, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1912 (1984); Jane Bridgewater, 49 Mo. L. REV. 830 (1984)
(noting Richman v. Charter Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp. 192, 194-95 (E.D. La. 1983), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part, 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985)); Michael T. Pedone, Note,
Valentine v. On Target, Inc.: ItIs Time To Hold Gun Dealers A ccountable for the Negligent
Storage of Firearms, 60 MD. L. REV. 441 (2001) (discussing Valentine v. On Target, Inc.,
727 A.2d 947 (Md. 1999)). But see Note, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1679 (1995) (proposing statute
imposing absolute liability for manufacture of ammunition). See generally Richard C.
Ausness, Tort Liability For the Sale of Non-Defective Products: An Analysis and Critique
of the Concept of Negligent Marketing, 53 S.C. L. REV. 907 (2002); Rachana Bhowmik et
al., A Sense of Duty: Retiring the "Special Relationship" Rule and Holding Gun
Manufacturers Liable for Negligently Distributing Guns, 4 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 42
(2000); Carl T. Bogus, Pistols, Politics and Products Liability, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 1103,
1145-48 (1991); Jean Macchiaroli Eggen & John G. Culhane, Gun Torts: Defining a Cause
of Action for Victims in Suits Against Gun Manufacturers, 81 N.C. L. REV. 151 (2002);
Mark Geistfeld, Tort Law and Criminal Behavior (Guns), 43 AIz. L. REV. 311 (2001);
David T. Hardy, Product Liability and Weapons Manufacture, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
541 (1984); David Kairys, Legal Claims of Cities Against the Manufacturers of Handguns,
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Each year, tens of thousands of Americans are killed by guns-roughly the
same number as are killed in car accidents. 22 In fact, there are almost as
many firearms in the United States as people. 23 While some ninety-eight
percent of all firearms are used lawfully, 24 the two to three million that are
used illegally each year cause enormous injury and suffering.)2' A
perennially-debated topic in legislatures across the nation is the question
of whether products liability law should have anything to say about
criminally inflicted losses of this type; 26 it is a controversial issue that has
been litigated with increasing frequency and intensity in recent years.
2. Injury Victim Litigation
A spate of decisions in the 1970s and 1980s were hostile to damage
claims brought by shooting victims alleging that handguns were inherently
defective. In their decisions, those courts frequently cited to the refusal of
71 TEMP. L. REV. 1 (1998); Timothy D. Lytton, Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry: A
Comparative Institutional Analysis, 32 CONN. L. REv. 47 (2000) [hereinafter Lawsuits];
Timothy D. Lytton, Tort Claims Against Gun Manufacturers for Crime-Related Injuries:
Defining a Suitable Role for the Tort System in Regulating the Firearms Industry, 65 Mo.
L. REV. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Tort Claims]; Jonathan E. Lowy, Litigating Against Gun
Manufacturers, 36 TRLAL 43 (Nov. 2000); Windle Turley, Manufacturers' and Suppliers'
Liability to Handgun Victims, 10 N. Ky. L. REv. 41 (1982); Aaron Twerski & Anthony J.
Sebok, Liability Without Cause? Further Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact as Applied to
Handgun Liability, 32 CoNN. L. REV. 1379 (2000).
122 Gun fatalities divide as follows: 48% suicides, 47% homicides, 4% accidents, and
1% legal justice system. In addition, another 125,000 people are injured by guns each year.
Tort Claims, supra note 121, at 2-3.
12' See Mark Barnes, Taking Aim: The Impetus Driving Suits Against Gun
Manufacturers, 27 PEPP. L. REv. 735, 736 (2000) (noting that about half of all American
households possess at least one gun).
124 Id.
125 There were 9390 gun-related homicides in the U.S. in 1996, in contrast to thirty in
Great Britain and fifteen in Japan. Frank J. Vandall, Economic and Causation Issues in City
Suits Against Gun Manufacturers, 27 PEPP. L. REV. 719, 719 (2000). One American child
dies from a gunshot every ninety-two minutes, an average of more than fifteen each day. Id.
126 Of course, like other manufacturers, manufacturers of firearms and ammunition are
subject to liability for misrepresentation and defects in design, warnings and instructions,
and manufacture. See, e.g., Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 792 A.2d 1145, 1149-57 (Md.
2002); Smith ex rel. Smith v. Bryco Arms, 33 P.3d 638, 643 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001).
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legislatures to ban handguns. *27 Two cases in the 1980s, however, were
decided the other way. In the first case, Richman v. Charter Arms Corp.,1
28
a federal district judge ruled that, while handguns are not defective under
ordinary products liability principles, the sale of such products might
constitute an ultra-hazardous activity.129 In the second case, Kelley v. R. G.
Industries, Inc.'130 an action against the manufacturer of a handgun used in
a grocery store robbery, the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that a
manufacturer may be subject to strict liability for selling a type of product
that is bad for society.' 3' Kelley held that strict tort liability could be
imposed on sellers of "Saturday Night Specials" for harm to victims from
the use of such guns. 3 2 In response to the holding in Kelley, the National
Rifle Association conducted a multi-million dollar campaign to have the
decision overturned, first by the Maryland legislature, and then by the
people in a referendum petition. In time, the gun lobby and gun control
127 Patterson v. Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206, 1209 n.5 (N.D. Tex. 1985) (rejecting
plaintiffs risk-utility argument under conventional strict products liability in tort, citing
many cases in accord):
[D]espite this Court's admiration for such a delightfully nonsensical claim: that
a product which does not have a defect can nevertheless, under the law, be
defective-the plaintiff s attorneys are simply wrong. Under Texas law, there can
be no products liability recover6 unless the product does have a defect. Without
this essential predicate, that something is wrong with the product, the risk/utility
balancing test does not even apply.
Id. at 1210-11; see also Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1202 (7th
Cir. 1984) (applying Illinois law and rejecting manufacturer's strict liability under
ultra-hazardous activity theory); Patterson, 608 F. Supp. at 1210-11; Mavilia v. Stoeger
Indus., 574 F. Supp. 107, 111 (D. Mass 1983) (rejecting tort claim for marketing handguns
and holding "as a matter of law ... the .38 caliber Llama automatic pistol . . . is not
inherently defective"); Burkett v. Freedom Arms, Inc., 704 P.2d 118, 120-21 (Or. 1985)
(rejecting strict liability claim based on manufacturer's conducting abnormally dangerous
activity). The Patterson court further noted that "the theory advanced by the plaintiffs
perverts the verypurpose of the 'risk/utility balancing test' [which] incorporates the ideathat
a defect is something that can be remedied or changed." Id. at 121.
128 Richman v. Charter Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp. 192, 194-95 (E.D. La. 1983), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part, 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985).
129 Id. at 194; see Marnie L. Sayles & James R. Lambden, Stop Shooting Down Tort
Liability: It Is Time to Resuscitate the Abnormally Dangerous Activity Doctrine Against
Handgun Manufacturers, 12 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 143,149 (2001).
130 Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143, 1147 (Md. 1985).
id. at 1159.
32 Id. "Saturday Night Specials" are poorly made, cheap, small, inaccurate, and easily
concealed handguns used principally for criminal activity rather than self-protection or other
legitimate activity. Id. at 1158-59.
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advocates agreed to a compromise: legislation that overturned Kelley but
prohibited the sale of Saturday Night Specials in the state of Maryland. The
voters, by referendum, approved the law. 133
A number of subsequent suits against manufacturers of handguns,134
assault rifles,'35 and ammunition 136 have involved claims for design defects,
negligent marketing, and strict liability for selling products that are
abnormally dangerous. While plaintiffs had some initial success in a
number of cases in the lower courts, and while an occasional court still
allows such a claim,'37 most of these gunshot victim cases have been
dismissed on grounds such as no duty to the victims, no defect (the guns
only did what they were designed to do), and the intervening event of
criminals putting them to improper use (the abuse of the guns by people,
not the guns themselves, are the proximate cause of harm). 3s
'33 The referendum passed by a vote of fifty-eight percent to forty-two percent. Bogus,
supra note 121. See generally Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 792 A.2d 1145 (Md. 2002)
(involving a child who shot himself in the head with his father's gun; describing legislative
developments and rejecting a claim that the gun was defective for failing to have child-proof
design).
' E.g., Hamilton v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055 (N.Y. 2001) (answering
certified question from lower court and finding that defendant gun manufacturers did not
owe plaintiffs a duty to exercise reasonable care in the marketing and distribution of their
guns); see also Hamilton v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp., 264 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 2001) (ordering that
the district court judge dismiss the complaint in Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802
(E.D.N.Y. 1999), vacated by 264 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 2001)).
131 See, e.g., Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116 (Cal. 2001), rev'g 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d
146 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
136 E.g., McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 1997) (2-1 decision) (Black
Talon hollow-point bullets not defectively designed; in dissent, Judge Calabresi reasoned
that the bullets properly might be classified as egregiously unsafe and, hence, not immune
from liability), aff'g McCarthy v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 916 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
13' E.g., Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2003) (2-1 decision) (applying
California law and allowing negligence and public nuisance claims), reh "g denied, 370 F.3d
860 (9th Cir. 2004) (including dissenting opinions to denial of rehearing en banc), cert.
denied 125 S. Ct. 865 (2005); Johnson v. Bryco Arms, 304 F. Supp. 2d 383, 389 (E.D.N.Y.
2004) (Weinstein, J.) (allowing negligence and public nuisance, but not design defect,
warranty, or strict liability for abnormally dangerous activity claims).
M3 The Third Restatement includes firearms in its short list of generically dangerous
products that are not defective in design. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. d.
(1998). On negligent marketing, see Ausness, supra note 121, at 962-64 (criticizing
negligent marketing concept as paternalistic and elitist) and Andrew J. McClurg, The
Tortious Marketing of Handguns: Strict Liability ls Dead, Long Live Negligence, 19 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 777, 806-18 (1996) (praising negligent marketing theory).
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3. Municipality Litigation
Following the successful partnership of state attorneys general and
major plaintiffs' law firms in cigarette litigation, a number of
municipalities filed claims against the gun industry for blanketing their
cities with an oversupply of guns, particularly cheap handguns, that far
exceeded the lawful market for such firearms.139 Following the first such
suit by New Orleans in 1998, over thirty cities and counties have instituted
"recoupment" lawsuits seeking to recover various municipal costs
associated with gun violence, such as the increased expenses of law
enforcement, emergency rescue services, medical care for gunshot victims,
prosecutorial and prison services, social services, and lost tax revenues.
Such lawsuits typically make claims against gun manufacturers,
distributors, trade associations, and major retailers for defective design
because of the absence of safety features, failure to provide adequate
warnings, negligent marketing and negligent distribution, public nuisance,
deceptive trade practices, and restitution for unjust enrichment. To date,
most of these cases have been dismissed, 4 ' but a number have survived
'
39 See generallyAusness, supra note 97; Ausness, supra note 121, at 936; Donald G.
Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71 U. CiN. L. REv. 741 (2003);
David Kairys, The Governmental Handgun Cases and the Elements and Underlying Policies
of Public Nuisance, 32 CONN. L. REv. 1175 (2000); David Kairys, The Origin and
Development of the GovernmentalHandgun Cases, 32 CONN. L. REv. 1163 (2000); Andrew
S. Cabana, Comment, Missing the Target-Municipal Litigation Against Handgun
Manufacturers: Abuse of the Civil Tort System, 9 GEO. MASON L. REv. 1127 (2001); Note,
Recovering the Costs of Public Nuisance Abatement: The Public and Private City Sue the
Gun Industry, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1521 (2000).
14 E.g., Philadelphia v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding no
proximate cause, remoteness, or standing and that "gun manufacturers are under no legal
duty to protect citizens from the deliberate and unlawful use of their products"); Camden
County Bd. v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d 536 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding no proximate
cause and remoteness); Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98 (Conn. 2001)
(finding that the mayor and city lacked standing); Mayor Baker v. Smith & Wesson Corp.,
No. A. 99C-09-283-FS, 2002 WL 31741522 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 27, 2002) (refusing to
impose liability on gun manufacturers using the municipal cost recovery rule); District of
Columbia v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp., 847 A.2d 1127 (D.C. 2004) (dismissing on grounds of
no duty and no public nuisance claim, but allowing claim for unreimbursed medical
expenses under a local assault gun statute); District of Columbia v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp.,
No. Civ.A 0428-00, 2002 WL 31811717 (D.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 16, 2002) (finding no duty,
no proximate cause and remoteness, citing Holmes v. Sec. Investor Protection Corp., 503
U.S. 258 (1992)), vacated by No. 03-CV-38, 2004 WL 2389750 (D.C. Oct. 19. 2004);
Penelas v. Arms Tech., Inc., 778 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Morial v. Smith &
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motions to dismiss and several have withstood appeal)" In view of the
diminishing likelihood of success, the increasing costs of litigation, and the
possibility that Congress may bar such lawsuits, at least a couple of cities
have simply abandoned their cases against the gun industry. 42
It is still too early to predict with confidence the ultimate outcome of
municipality gun litigation. While the public nuisance claim might be a
viable basis of recovery, courts will have to find a way around a large
variety of common law obstacles, including proximate cause (or
remoteness), standing, duty, the appropriateness of public nuisance and
restitution in this new type of litigation,'43 and the "municipal cost recovery
rule," the persistent (if dubious) doctrine prohibiting public bodies from
recovering the costs of emergency governmental services.'" In addition,
another particularly formidable obstacle to recovery is the growing number
of state statutes that generally prohibit actions against gun manufacturers.
In Virginia, such a statute prohibits claims by local governments against
Wesson Corp., 785 So. 2d I (La. 2001) (finding that a subsequently enacted statute barred
New Orleans' lawsuit).
41 E.g., White v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 816 (N.D. Ohio 2000); City
of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222, 1247, 1249 (Ind. 2003) (allowing
claims for public nuisance, negligent marketing, negligent design, and deceptive advertising
to proceed); Chicago v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp., 785 N.E.2d 16, 24, 35 (I11. App. Ct. 2002)
(allowing public nuisance claim), rev 'd, 821 NE.2d 1099 (I11. 2004); Boston v. Smith &
Wesson Corp., No. 199902590,2000 WL 1473568 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 13, 2000); Mayor
James v. Arms Tech., Inc., 820 A.2d 27, 51-53 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (allowing
negligence, public nuisance, and punitive damages claims); Cincinnati v. Beretta, U.S.A.
Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136 (Ohio 2002).
142 E.g., Steven Harras, Cincinnati Drops Suit Against Gun Industry; Suit Deemed
Unwinnable and Wasteful, 31 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 427 (May 19,
2003) (noting Boston's similar action in 2002 and discussing current Congressional action
to bar such litigation).
143 See Gifford, supra note 139, at 764-69.
144 Also referred to as the "free public services doctrine." Compare Mayor James, 820
A.2d 27 (rejecting doctrine and allowing action to proceed), with Mayor Baker, 2002 WL
31741522 (applying doctrine and dismissing action). See generally Timothy D. Lytton,
Should Government Be Allowed to Recover the Costs of Public Services from Tortfeasors?:
Tort Subsidies, the Limits ofLoss Spreading, andthe Free Public Services Doctrine, 76 TUL.
L. REv. 727,727, 730 (2002) (arguing for the rule's abrogation because it "shields industrial
tortfeasors from liability[,] ... constitutes a tort subsidy to industry and functions as an
insurance scheme for industrial accidents paid for by taxpayers"); David C. McIntyre, Note,
Tortfeasor LiabilityforDisaster Response Costs: Accountingfor the True Cost ofAccidents,
55 FORDHAM L. REv. 1001 (1987).
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manufacturers and other sellers for injuries caused by guns.145
D. Other Products
As mentioned at the outset, every type of product is inherently
dangerous in some respect; as such, there is virtually no end to the list of
products that might be included in this category.'46 However, a small
number of particular products must be briefly mentioned here because of
the serious and widespread nature of their inherent risks.
1. Drugs
The largest category of all generically dangerous products consists of
prescription drugs'47 which are designed to alter the human body. Normally,
the chemical compounds in prescription drugs are properly researched,
145 VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-915.1 (Michie 2000).
146 Silicone breast implants, for example, have led to many thousands of claims against
their manufacturers and the plaintiffs have prevailed in some cases. E.g., Dow Chem. Co.
v. Mahlum, 970 P.2d 98 (Nev. 1998); Baxter Healthcare Corp.v. Grimes, No. 05-95-0682,
1998 WL 548729 (Tex. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 1998); see also In re Breast Implant Cases, 942
F. Supp. 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (discussing possible transfer of thousands of cases); Silicone
Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig. (MDL 926), 837 F. Supp. 1128 (N.D. Ala. 1993),
vacated in part by 887 F. Supp. 1455 (N.D. Ala. 1995).
Defendants prevailed in many others, often because the plaintiffs failed to prove
causation. E.g., Meister v. Med. Eng'g Corp., 267 F.3d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that
the expert testimony on causation failed to meet the Daubert standards); Allison v. McGhan
Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300 (1 1th Cir. 2001) (applying Geogia law and finding that the
expert testimony on causation failed to satisfy the Daubert admissibility standards); see Gina
Kolata, Company Making Case to Allow Breast Implants, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2003, at A5
(discussing the Institute of Medicine committee study in 2000, which reviewed
epidemiological data and found no evidence that breast implants cause any serious disease,
including cancer, neurological diseases, autoimmune diseases like lupus, and connective
tissue diseases like arthritis).
As with asbestos, this massive litigation has bankrupted at least one manufacturer. See
In re Dow Coming Corp., 280 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2002). See generally Jule M. Spanbauer,
Breast Implants as Beauty Ritual: Woman's Sceptre and Prison, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMIMSM
157 (1997); Krista R. Stine, Silicone, Science and Settlements: Breast Implants anda Search
for Truth, 63 DEF. CouNs. J. 491 (1996); Evan Caplan, Note, "Milking the Dow":
Compensating the Victims of Silicone Gel Breast Implants at the Expense of the Parent
Corporation, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 121 (1997).
14' Dangers of over-the-counter drugs are normally less serious but, nonetheless, they
may be substantial in individual cases. See OWEN, supra note 8, §§ 8.10, 9.6.
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designed, tested, produced, and labeled so they accomplish their goal of
improving human pathologies effectively and with relatively minimal (or
at least acceptable) side effects. However, drug manufacturers sometimes
fail to discover or anticipate harmful side effects or, worse yet, they may
deliberately overlook or even conceal the risks of a profitable new drug.'48
Reports of new prescription drug side-effect problems, such as heart valve
damage attributed to the diet drugs called "fen-phen," appear with
disturbing frequency. 149 Apart from the typical warning adequacy issues in
drug products liability litigation, the most significant generic risk issue is
whether a drug manufacturer may be subject to liability for design
defectiveness, an issue treated elsewhere from a variety of perspectives.15
2. Asbestos
Asbestos has had a crushing effect on workers, manufacturers, and the
courts. 5' Since the 1970s, the courts have been hit by a barrage of cases
involving the ravages of asbestos. Asbestos is a mineral converted into
' Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (Ct. App. 1967); Axen v. Am.
Home Prods. Corp., 974 P.2d 224, 228 (Or. Ct. App. 1999); GlaxoSmithKline Concealed
Paxi! Flaws, New York State Attorney General Charges, 32 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 23, at 536 (June 14, 2004). The same is sometimes true of medical devices. See
Kurt Eichenwald, MakerAdmits That It Hid Problems ofArtery Tool, N.Y. TIMES, June 13,
2003, at A5. See generally OWEN, supra note 8, § 18.1.
149 See In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine, Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. MDL 1203, Civ. A 99-20593, 2002 WL 32067308 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 1998)
(ordering audit of certain settlement trust claims); In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine,
Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine) Products Liab. Litig., No. MDL, 203, 2001 WL 497313
(E.D. Pa. May 9, 2001) (describing fen-phen litigation and settlement); Reed Abelson &
Jonathan D. Glater, Texas Jury Rules Against A Diet Drug, N.Y. TMES, Apr. 28, 2004, at
C5 (reporting $1 billion verdict to family of woman who died from lung disease, and that
Wyeth had set aside $16 billion to cover costs of fen-phen litigation).
"So See OWEN, supra note 8, §§ 8.10, 9.6, 10.4. Prescription drug claims normally are
not subject to the defense of federal preemption. See id. § 14.4.
15' For a discussion of the asbestos litigation generally, see American Law of Products
Liability 3d § 122.1 (2004); Griffin B. Bell, Asbestos Litigation and Judicial Leadership:
The Courts 'Duty to Help Solve the Asbestos Litigation Crisis (National Legal Center for the
Public Interest 2002); Stephen J. Carroll et al.,Asbestos Litigation Costs and Compensation:
An Interim Report (Rand 2002), available at http://www.rand.org/publications/DB/DB397/
DB397.pdf; Christopher F. Edley & Paul C Weiler, Asbestos: A Multi-Billion Dollar Crisis,
30 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 383 (1993); Francis E. McGovern, The Tragedy of the Asbestos
Commons, 88 VA. L. REV. 1721 (2002).
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insulation materials which can generate deadly dust that causes various
lung diseases. Despite its highly useful insulation characteristics, asbestos
has caused so much death and suffering that it may be fairly viewed as
inherently defective in design in a "macro-balance" of its aggregate social
costs and benefits. 52 From the start of the asbestos litigation, however, the
theory of liability generally has not been that asbestos is defective per se,
but that manufacturers failed to provide sufficient warnings to alert workers
of the lethal dangers of inhaling asbestos dust.'53
The seminal asbestos case was Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products
Corp.,15 the first strict products liability case to uphold a verdict for an
installer of asbestos insulation against the insulation manufacturers.
Clarence Borel worked as an industrial insulation worker from 1936 until
he was disabled in 1969 by asbestosis, a lung disease. Thereafter, he
developed mesothelioma, a fatal form of lung cancer which eventually
killed him. Both asbestosis and mesothelioma result from asbestos fibers
lodging in the lungs of a person who inhales asbestos dust. In his
employment, Borel was regularly and necessarily exposed to heavy
concentrations of asbestos dust generated by the insulation materials he
installed. 5' Ruling that "[a] product must not be made available to the
public without disclosure of those dangers that the application of
reasonable foresight would reveal,"' 56 the court affirmed the verdict for the
plaintiff."7
Borel opened the floodgates for asbestos litigation, and the resulting
compensatory and punitive awards, together with the enormous litigation
costs of defending hundreds of thousands of cases, have bankrupted much
15 See Johnstone v. Am. Oil Co., 7 F.3d 1217, 1223 (5th Cir. 1993) (approving jury
finding that asbestos was not defective, based on proof that its effectiveness as a heat
insulator on Navy ships during World War II helped win the war); Halpben v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110, 114 (La. 1986). But see Owens-Coming
Fiberglass Corp. v. Stone, No. 03-94-00449-CV, 1996 WL 397435, at *2 (Tex. App. July
17, 1996) (finding byjury that defendant's asbestos product "was not defective, taking into
consideration 'its utility and the risk involved in its use"').
i3 Inadequate warning remains the principal theory of defectiveness in these cases. See,
e.g., In re Asbestos Litig., 799 A.2d 1151 (Del. 2002).
154 Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1103 (5th Cir. 1973)
(Wisdom, J.).
' Id. at 1082-83.
156 Id. at 1090.
"I Id. at 1103.
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of the asbestos industry.'s The litigation has swamped the dockets of many
courts. 59 Weary of the lengthy litigation, many of these courts have sought
to manage asbestos cases more efficiently through procedural mechanisms
such as aggregation, while preserving present and future victims' rights to
reasoned judicial resolution of their claims.' The courts and Congress
continue to struggle to find ways to manage and resolve the complicated
issues of fairness, practicality, and bankruptcy that surround this specific
product. 61
3. Lead Paint
An increasingly frequent type of litigation concerns lead poisoning.162
' Johns-Manville, the most prominent asbestos firm, declared bankruptcy in 1983, and
about 60 more firms have followed in its wake, filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.
Joseph E. Stiglitz et al., The Impact ofAsbestos Liabilities on Workers in Bankrupt Firms,
12 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 51, 52-54 (2003) (noting also that 47 states have experienced at
least one asbestos-related bankruptcy); see also Joel Slawotsky, New York's Article 16 and
Multiple Defendant Product Liability Litigation: A Time To Rethink the Impact ofBankrupt
Shares on Judgment Molding, 76 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 397 (2002).
159 See, e.g., Steven Harras, Asbestos Reform Summit Held on Capitol Hill; Congress,
Business, Lawyers Seek Solution, 31 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 298 (Apr.
7, 2003) (noting estimates that "[a]pproximately 250,000 asbestos claims are currently
pending in courts across the country, with up to 3.1 million claims anticipated in the future,"
and that "the courts have adjudicated $30 billion in asbestos claims, with about $200 billion
in claims pending or anticipated"; Carroll et al., supra note 151, at 40 (corroborating the
aforementioned figures and noting that more than 600,000 people have filed claims against
6000 defendants and that estimates are for 1-3 million future claimants).
1' See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
61 See, e.g., Chavers v. Gatke Corp., 132 Cal. Rptr. 198,201 (Ct. App. 2003) (affirming
that neither civil conspiracy nor concert-of-action theory were available to support a claim
against a manufacturer who did not make the asbestos products to which the plaintiff was
exposed); Long-AwaitedAsbestosReform BillReleased; Hatch Proposes $108 Billion Trust
Fund, 31 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep (BNA) No. 21, at 458 (May 26, 2003); Slawotsky, supra
note 158.
162 See generally Richard L. Cupp, Jr., State Medical Reimbursement Lawsuits After
Tobacco: Is the Domino Effect for Lead Paint Manufacturers and Others Fair Game?, 27
PEPP. L. REv. 685 (2000); Michael I. Krauss, Regulation Masquerading as Judgment: Chaos
Masquerading as Tort Law, 71 MiSS. L.J. 631, 666-85 (2001); Scott A. Smith, Turning
Lead into Asbestos and Tobacco- Litigation Alchemy Gone Wrong, 71 DEF. COUN. J. 119
(2004); Amber E. Dean, Comment, Lead Paint Public Entity Lawsuits: Has the Broad
Stroke of Tobacco and Firearms Litigation Painted a Troubling Picture for Lead Paint
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For much of the twentieth century, until its use in household paints was
banned in 1978, lead pigment was an important ingredient of paint because
it increased durability and made it smooth and easy to wash. For many
decades, coat upon coat of lead-based paint covered the walls of most of
the nations' residences. As the century progressed, some of this housing
began to deteriorate and paint began peeling off the walls, leaving piles of
lead paint chips in decaying houses around the nation. The problem is that
lead, said to taste as "sweet as candy,"' 63 is also highly toxic-particularly
when ingested by toddlers ever on the lookout for objects to place in their
mouths. As a result, approximately one million young American children
currently have damaging levels of lead in their blood."4 The consequences
of ingestion can be severe, including speech impairment, decreased
memory and intelligence, learning disabilities, brain damage, autism,
kidney damage, and even death. 6 s For at least a century paint
manufacturers have known of the hazards lead poses to humans,'66 but they
were slow to inform the public; while our government did not ban lead in
residential paint until the late 1970s, other nations began banning its use as
early as the 1920s.'67
Beginning in the late 1980s, a number of products liability claims were
brought against paint manufacturers for lead poisoning in children. To date,
lead poisoning victims have faced the apparently insurmountable problem
of identifying the particular manufacturers that made the pigments and
paints in the chips eaten by particular victims. The plaintiffs' inability to
meet their conventional burden of proof on causation has been fatal in these
cases, with most courts refusing to apply market share liability (or other
theories ofjoint liability) to hold the industry liable as a whole.'68
Manufacturers?, 28 PEPP. L. REv. 915, 917-18 (2001); Diane Cabo Freniere, Comment,
Private Causes ofAction Against Manufacturers of Lead-Based Paint: A Response to the
Lead Paint Manufacturers' Attempt to Limit Their Liability by Seeking Abrogation of
Parental Immunity, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 381 (1991); Mark P. Gagliardi, Note,
Stirring Up the Debate in Rhode Island: Should Lead Paint Manufacturers Be Held Liable
fortheHarm Caused byLeadPaint?, 7 ROGERWILLIAMSU. L.REv. 341 (2002) (examining
Rhode Island lead paint litigation).
163 Cupp, supra note 162, at 692.
'64 Dean, supra note 162, at 915-18 (noting the varying estimates).
161 Id. at 918.
166 See Cupp, supra note 162, at 692 (noting that one manufacturer warned of lead
paint's dangers in an article published in 1904).
167 Id. at 692-93.
161 See, e.g., Jefferson v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 106 F.3d 1245 (5th Cir. 1997) (applying
Louisiana law); Santiago v. Sherwin Williams Co., 3 F.3d 546 (1 st Cir. 1993) (2-1 decision)
(applying Massachusetts law); Lewis v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 793 N.E.2d 869, 879 (I11. App.
Ct. 2003) (allowing, however, a claim for civil conspiracy), reh g denied, 2003 111. App.
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Following in the footsteps of the successful cigarette litigation, a large
number of cities, and the state of Rhode Island, sued the paint industry on
various grounds, seeking to recover the enormous costs of cleaning up lead
paint hazards, caring for poisoned children, and educating the public on the
hazards of lead.169 Though a couple of the early suits brought by
Philadelphia and New Orleans ran into statutes of limitations problems, 7 °
New York brought a subsequent claim with more success.171 Additional
cities have brought similar claims.'72 A number of claims in the Rhode
Island suit, which included counts for public nuisance, other torts, and
unfair trade practices, survived motions to dismiss,'73 but the trial judge
declared a mistrial when the jury became deadlocked. 74 The next week, a
lawsuit brought by two dozen New Jersey municipalities was dismissed.'75
The trial judge in the Rhode Island suit subsequently ruled that the state
could retry the public nuisance component of the case.176 It is too early to
predict whether the public entity claims against lead paint manufacturers
will ultimately prove successful, but the litigation results to date, reflecting
plaintiffs' difficulties with manufacturer identification and statutes of
limitations, illustrate the significant problems confronting these claims.
LEXIS 1068 (I11. App. Ct. July29, 2003); Brenner v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 732 N.Y.S.2d 799
(N.Y. App. Div. 2001); see also Sabater v. Lead Paint Indus. Ass'n, 704 N.Y.S.2d 800 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2000) (dismissing some claims); Skipworth v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 690 A.2d 169
(Pa. 1997). But see Jackson v. Glidden Co., 647 N.E.2d 879, 884 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995)
(allowing claims for alternative liability and market share liability).
169 See Dean, supra note 162, at 915-16.
70 City of Philadelphia v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 994 F.2d 112, 122,127-28 (3d Cir. 1993)
(applying Pennsylvania law and rejecting alternative liability and market share liability
theories); Hous. Auth. ofNew Orleans v. Standard Paint & Varnish Co., 612 So. 2d 916 (La.
Ct. App. 1993).
... New York v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 644 N.Y.S.2d 919 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (holding
that plaintiffs had adequately pled causes of action for indemnity and restitution).
172 See, e.g., Michael Bologna, Chicago Uses Public Nuisance Theory to Sue Paint
Makers Over Lead-Based Risks, 30 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at 808 (Sept.
16, 2002). Other major cities, such as New York, St. Louis, Milwaukee, and San Francisco
filed similar actions. See OWEN, supra note 8, at 669 n. 162.
173 Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, No. 99-5226, 2001 WL 345830 (R.I. Super. Ct.
Apr. 2, 2001).
114 Martha Kessler, Rhode Island Suit May Proceed AfterJudge's Denial ofPos Trial
Motions, 31 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 324 (Apr. 14, 2003); Judge
Declares Mistrial in Lead -Paint Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2002, at A5.
' Associated Press, Suit DismissedAgainst Makers of LeadPaint, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
5, 2002, at B6.
1
7 6 See State Judge Rules RI. May Proceed with Nuisance SuitAgainst Manufacturers,
31 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 484 (June 9, 2003).
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4. Fast Foods
The most recent, perhaps the "ultimate," type of generic liability
lawsuit is represented by two putative class actions filed against fast food
retailers for obesity and other health problems alleged to have resulted from
the consumption of too much "junk food" sold by the defendants.177 The
first suit filed, Barber v. McDonald's Corp.,'78 sought to certify a national
class action against McDonald's, Burger King, KFC, and Wendy's for
intentionally and negligently selling food that is high in fat, salt, sugar, and
cholesterol without properly labeling the food or warning consumers of its
risks.179 The named plaintiff, fifty-six-year-old Caesar Barber, stood five
feet eleven inches tall and weighed 285 pounds at the time of his second
heart attack, which occured after eating two or three fast food meals a day
over an extended period of time. The class for which certification was
sought consisted of persons who consumed the defendants' fast foods and
became obese or developed coronary heart disease, diabetes, high blood
pressure, high cholesterol levels, or other health problems. The lawyer for
the plaintiffs reportedly decided not to pursue Barber, focusing instead
upon Pelman v. McDonald's Corp.,' a different class action against
McDonald's brought on behalfof obese children, including one 400-pound
fifteen-year-old suffering from Type I diabetes who claims to have eaten
at McDonald's daily since he was six. 8'
"' The litigation is championed by public interest law professor John Banzhaf of
George Washington University Law School, who teaches courses in Legal Activism, Tort
Law, and Administrative Law. See Professor John F. Banzhaf III, at www.banzhaf.net (last
visited Oct. 9, 2004).
"'
7 8 Barberv. McDonald's Corp., N.Y. Sup. Ct., Bronx Cty., No. 23145/2002, (filed July
24, 2002), http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/mcdonalds/barbermcds72302cmp.pdf; see
New York Man Files National Class Action Alleging Fast Food Chains Make People Fat,
30 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 674 (Aug. 5,2002); Henry Fountain, Living
Large; Our Just (Burp!) Desserts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2002, § 4, at 6.
179 Cf Franklin E. Crawford, Note, Fitfor Ordinary Purpose? Tobacco, Fast Food, and
the Implied Warranty at Merchantability, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1165 (2002) (discussing the
applicability of the implied warranty of merchantability to fast-food litigation).
'
80 Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), vacated in part
by 396 F.3d 508 (2d Cir. 2005).
181 Id. at 519; see also Roger Parloff, Is Fat the Next Tobacco?, FORTUNE MAGAZINE,
Jan. 21, 2003, available at http://www.fortune.com/fortune/articles/
0,15 114,409670,00.html.
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Observing that its failure to act decisively "could spawn thousands of
similar 'McLawsuits,"" t 2 the court promptly dismissed the Pelman
complaint on several grounds: that fast food restaurants have no duty to
warn consumers of the open, obvious, and well-known fact that such foods
contain high levels of cholesterol, fat, salt, and sugar; that the complaint
failed adequately to plead proximate cause because it did not specify how
often the children ate such foods and failed to account for other factors that
may have contributed to the children's health problems; that the complaint
failed to specify how the fats, sugars, and other substances may have been
addictive; and that it failed to allege whether the defendants purposefully
manufactured the fast foods with addictive qualities." 3 At its core, the court
observed that the lawsuit raised vital questions of personal responsibility,
1 84
an issue highlighted by the derisive popular reactions to the filing of these
lawsuits, as noted by the press. 8 ' Simply put, because the complaint failed
to allege that consumers are unaware of "the potential ill health effects of
eating at McDonald's, they cannot blame McDonald's if they, nonetheless,
choose to satiate their appetite with a surfeit of super-sized McDonald's
products." '186 The plaintiffs refiled8 7 and later abandoned their warnings
182 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 518, 543.
183 Id. at 531-43.
' "The issue of determining the breadth of personal responsibility underlies much of
the law: where should the line be drawn between an individual's own responsibility to take
care of herself and society's responsibility to ensure that others shield her?" Id. at 516.
185 See id. at 518 n.5 (quoting, among others, the following reports: Debra Goldman,
Consumer Republic: Common Sense May Not Be McDonald's Ally For Long, 14 ADWEEK,
E. ed. (Dec. 12, 2002), available at 2002 WL 103089868 ("[T]he masses have expressed
their incredulity at and contempt for the litigious kids-and their parents-who won't take
responsibility for a lifetime of chowing down Happy Meals. With much tongue-clucking,
the vox populi bemoans yet another symptom of the decline of personal responsibility and
the rise of the cult of victimhood."); Amity Shlaes, Lawyers Get Fat on McDonald's, CHI.
TRIB., Nov. 27,2002, at 25 ("Every now and then America draws a cartoon of herself for the
amusement of the rest of the world. Last week's fat lawsuit against McDonald's is one of
those occasions."); see also Parloff, supra note 181 ("News of the lawsuit drew hoots of
derision."); Jonathan Turley, Betcha Can't Sue Just One, L.A. TIMES, July 24, 2002,
available at 2002 WL 2492444 ("Finally, there is the question of personal responsibility,
which seems often ignored in these massive lawsuits. We may soon see campaigns from the
industry reminding us that 'Twinkies don't kill people, people kill people."').
186 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 517-18. It should be recalled that, in the 1960s, the ALl
included butter in section 402A's safe harbor of inherently dangerous food products
commonly known to produce cholesterol and increase the risk of heart attacks.
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claim. The court dismissed the remaining claims of deceptive advertising
under the state Consumer Protection Act. 8' Plaintiffs have had more
success with other food claims,8 9 and they reportedly have decided to
pursue such claims with vigor, 9 ' assuming that state legislatures do not
interfere. 9 Time alone will tell whether plaintiffs' counsel in the future
will be able to muster sufficiently weighty arguments for "McLawsuits" of
this type.
III. REFORM LEGISLATION
A. Inherent Risk Legislation Generally
A number of states and the federal government have enacted legislation
addressing, in one way or another, the issue of products that contain
substantial inherent risks. Some state and federal statutes ban the sale of
such dangerous products as fireworks, cigarettes, alcohol, and controlled
substances to unauthorized persons,'92 while other states have enacted
products liability reform legislation that limits a manufacturer's liability for
generic product risks. North Carolina's provision, for example, shields
manufacturers from design defect claims arising out of "an inherent
characteristic of the product that cannot be eliminated without substantially
compromising the product's usefulness or desirability and that is
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965).
187 See David J. Kaufmann, Franchising Fast Food Inanity, 229 N.Y.L.J. 3, col. 1
(2003).
' Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., No. 02 Civ. 7821(RWS), 2003 WL 22052778
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2003) [hereinafter Pelman II], vacated in part by 396 F.3d 508 (2d Cir.
Jan. 25, 2005).
189 See Kate Zernike, Lawyers Shift Focus From Big Tobacco to Big Food, N.Y. TiES,
Apr. 9, 2004, at Al (reporting that McDonald's paid $12 million to settle a claim for failing
to disclose that its French fries contained beef fat, that Kraft stopped using trans fats in
Oreos, and that the makers of a puffy cheese snack, Pirate's Booty, paid $4 million to settle
a claim that it understated fat grams).
190 See id.
191 Louisiana has already enacted legislation prohibiting such suits. Congress held
hearings on such a bill in 2004. See infra Part III.
192 Inaddition to banning the sale of dangerous products, legislatures sometimes address
their disposal. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1211 (2001) (prohibiting the disposal of refrigerators
without first removing their latching doors); 42 U.S.C. § 9267 (1999) (dealing with batteries
and other products containing toxic chemicals).
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recognized by the ordinary person with the ordinary knowledge common
to the community."' 93 Statutes of this type quite clearly contemplate
products such as alcohol and cigarettes. " Other states have enacted similar
generic risk statutes, but often with important variations.'95 New Jersey's
statute, for example, generally shields manufacturers of such products from
design defect claims, but allows these types of claims for industrial
machinery and products whose designs are "egregiously unsafe. 196
California and Texas enacted nearly identical reform statutes, adopting the
safe harbor list of inherently dangerous products in comment i to the
Second Restatement, which shelters manufacturers of such products from
most products liability exposure.' 97 In 1998, however, California's
legislature deleted "tobacco" from the safe harbor list of protected products
and added new provisions specifically authorizing products liability suits
against the tobacco industry.'98 Some statutory provisions are more
specific, such as a North Carolina provision that protects manufacturers of
prescription drugs that are unavoidably unsafe as long as adequate warnings
are provided.199
'91 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-6(c) (2003).
... See, e.g., Lane v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 853 So. 2d 1144 (Miss. 2003)
(holding that the inherent characteristic provision of a products liability reform statute bars
all tobacco cases), reh 'g denied, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 482 (Miss. Sept, 25, 2003).
195 E.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 1714.45(a), (b) (West 1998); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 600.2947(5) (2000); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(b) (1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-6(c)
(2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3 (West 2000); TEx. Civ. PRAc. AND REM. CODE ANN.
§ 82.004 (Vernon 1997).
196 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3. But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. e.
'9' CAL. CiV. CODE § 1714.45(a), (b); TEx. Civ. PRAC. AND REM. CODE ANN. § 82.004
(providing that manufacturers and sellers are immunized from products liability, except for
manufacturing defects and breach of express warranty, if:
(1) the product is inherently unsafe and the product is known to be unsafe by the
ordinary consumer who consumes the product with the ordinary knowledge
common to the community; and (2) the product is a common consumer product
intended for personal consumption, such as sugar, castor oil, alcohol, tobacco, and
butter, as identified in Comment i to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts).
199 CAL. CUv. CODE § 1714.45(e), (f), (g).
' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-6(d) (2003).
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B. Alcoholic Beverages
Beginning in the 1960s and continuing through the 1970s and 1980s,
the FDA and Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, as well as other
members of Congress, pressed the alcohol industry to adopt a voluntary
labeling program warning of the dangers of their beverages.2"0 One
proposed statute would have required every alcoholic beverage container
to be labeled, on a rotating basis, with warnings that alcohol consumption
1) during pregnancy can cause mental retardation and other birth defects to
the baby; 2) impairs a person's ability to drive a car or operate machinery;
3) is particularly hazardous in combination with some drugs; 4) can
increase the risk of developing hypertension, liver disease, and cancer; and
5) is a drug and may be addictive.2 ' An earlier bill had substituted for 5) a
warning that its rapid consumption can cause immediate death.
2 2
By the late 1980s, proposed legislation of this type was widely debated
in Congress, state legislatures, and the media. Bills were filed and rejected
in Florida and California, and one passed in the Massachusetts house in
1987. More than sixty national health organizations supported the federal
bill summarized above, and a Gallup poll found that nearly eighty percent
of Americans favored the labeling of alcoholic beverages with health
warnings.2"3 A national editorial contended: "Consumers need to be able to
make informed choices about everything they eat or drink or take as
medicine. Especially alcoholic beverages. They need to know what's in
them. And to be alerted to any possible hazards. 20" Citing frightening
statistics-that 100,000 Americans die from alcohol use each year, that
thousands of children are born each year with alcohol-related birth defects,
that "18 million Americans and their families are torn apart by addiction
and related problems," and that the annual loss to the nation exceeds $100
billion-the House and Senate sponsors of the warning label legislation,
Congressman John Conyers and Senator Strom Thurmond, urged its
200 See OWEN, supra note 8, at 672.
20t S. 2047, 100th Cong. (1988).
202 See DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY CASES AND
MATERIALS 427 (4th ed. 2004).
203 See OWEN, supra note 8, at 673.
204 John Conyers & Strom Thurmond, We Can't Wait for the Industry to Act, USA
TODAY, April 8, 1988, at 10A.
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passage."'
Finally, Congress enacted a compromise bill, the Alcoholic Beverage
Labeling Act of 1988,206 requiring that alcoholic beverages be labeled as
follows: "GOVERNMENT WARNING: (1) According to the Surgeon
General, women should not drink alcoholic beverages during pregnancy
because of the risk ofbirth defects. (2) Consumption of alcoholic beverages
impairs your ability to drive a car or operate machinery, and may cause
health problems. 2 7
This legislation preempts products liability claims for warnings
inadequacies, at least on beverage containers.2 8
C. Firearms
In recent years, a number of states have enacted legislation seeking to
protect makers and sellers of firearms and ammunition from liability for
injury and death resulting from improper use of their products. Some
statutes bar the use of a risk-benefit analysis for judging the defectiveness
of guns and ammunition,20 9 and some provide that it is the unlawful use of
guns, not their lawful manufacture and sale, that is the proximate cause of
205 Id. Noting that they had "waited more than a decade for the industry to heed the
Food and Drug Administration's call for warning labels," Conyers and Thurmond
concluded: "What the alcohol marketers fear is information. What the public needs is that
information. If marketers will not act responsibly to educate consumers about the real risks
and costs, then Congress should." Id.
206 Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act of 1988, 27 U.S.C. § 213-219 (2001).2
17 Id. § 215.
208 Id. The act's preemption clause provides that state law may not require any other
warning to be placed on any alcoholic beverage container or package. Id. at § 216; see also
Davis, supra note 55; Dukes, supra note 53. Claims for adulteration and fraudulent
misrepresentation are likely to survive the Act, but warnings claims, even creative ones, are
preempted. See Carroll, supra note 43 (proposing implied warranty claims for allergic
reaction). On federal preemption generally, see OWEN, supra note 8, § 14.4.
A tragic footnote to this legislation concerns its senatorial champion, Strom Thurmond,
who fought for years for its enactment. In 1993, his daughter was struck and killed by a
drunk driver. See OWEN, supra note 8, at 673 n. 196.
209 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.4(a) (West 1998) (repealed 2002) ("[N]o firearm
or ammunition shall be deemed defective in design on the basis that the benefits of the
product do not outweigh the risk of injury, damage, or death when discharged."). In 2002,
however, California's legislature repealed the protection of firearms from products liability
in § 1714.4.
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most harm.2"' The National Rifle Association has lobbied diligently for
reform legislation along these lines, and many states have now enacted
statutes of this type.21" ' Virginia has a statute that removes authority from
local governments to sue manufacturers and sellers of firearms and
ammunition for damages resulting from their lawful manufacture and sale,
instead reserving the right to bring such actions for the Commonwealth.212
Pointing in the other direction, toward gun control, an ordinance in the
District of Columbia provides that sellers of assault weapons and machine
guns are strictly liable in tort for injury or death caused by the discharge of
such weapons in the District." 3
D. Fast Foods
In 2004, the United States House of Representatives, but not the
Senate, passed a "cheeseburger bill" banning obesity-related lawsuits
against restaurants and other food sellers. Similar "Baby McBills" were
proposed in many states.2"4 A flurry of such bills were addressed by state
legislatures and, by the end of the 2004 legislative session, about a dozen
states had enacted such legislation. 215 The reasonableness of this type of
210 E.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-58-1 (Michie Supp. 2003) ("[T]he unlawful use of
firearms, rather than their lawful manufacture, distribution, or sale, is the proximate cause
of any injury arising from their unlawful use.").
2' See, e.g., ALASKASTAT, § 09.65.155 (Michie 2004); Cal. Civ. Code § 1714.4; IDAHO
CODE § 6-1410(Michie 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.60 (West Supp. 2004); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 27-1-720 (2003); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.131 (2003); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 99B-11 (2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-40 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2003); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 21-58-1 to -4; TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.006 (Vernon 1997); WAsH.
Rev. CODE ANN. § 7.72.030 (West 2000).
212 VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-915.1 (Michie 2003).
213 D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-2551.02 (2001).
21, Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act, H.R. 339, 108th Cong. (2004);
H.R. REP. No. 108-432 (2004); see Zernike, supra note 189; House Passes 'Cheeseburger
Bill,'Bans Obesity-RelatedSuits Against Food Industry, 72 U.S.LAWWEEK-LEGALNEWs,
March 16, 2004, at 2547.
215 Louisiana's statute, enacted in 2003 and perhaps the first of its kind, is typical:
[A]ny manufacturer, distributor or seller of a food or non-alcoholic beverage
intended for human consumption shall not be subject to civil liability for personal
injury or wrongful death where liability is premised upon an individual's weight
gain, obesity or a health condition related to weight gain or obesity and resulting
from his long term consumption of a food or non-alcoholic beverage.
LA.REv. STAT. ANN. § 2799.6; see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-681 (2003); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 13-21-1101 (2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.37 (West Supp. 2003); GA. CODE ANN.
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statute suggests that legislatures in other states will take similar action in
the future.216
IV. CONCLUSION
The extent to which manufacturers should be subject to liability for
harm from inherent product hazards, from the risk of cancer from cigarettes
to obesity from fast foods, is a fascinating, unresolved domain, lying at the
untamed edge of products liability law. It may be hoped that courts will
continue to resolve the basic principles of responsibility for such harm
largely in the commonsense way they have thus far; that is, manufacturers
are properly required to provide warnings of foreseeable hazards that lie
hidden in their products, and they surely should be held accountable for
tricking consumers into thinking that their products are safer than they truly
are. Yet, responsibility for unavoidable dangers of which consumers are
aware, because such dangers are warned about or are plainly visible,
generally should reside with consumers themselves, as regular risks of life.
Normal insurance mechanisms, rather than the products liability litigation
system, are preferable institutions to address the inevitable losses from
widely known inherent product hazards. In this untamed judicial land, the
courts should simply step aside, and legislatures should step up to limit the
most dubious types of inherent product hazard litigation-such as
responsibility for obesity from fast food-to help relieve both sellers and
the courts of burdens that should remain the personal responsibility of
individual consumers.
§ 26-02-430 (Supp. 2003); IDAHO CODE § 39-8701; Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.595 (2004); S.D.
Codified Laws § 21-61-2; UTAH CODEANN. § 78-27d-101 (Supp. 2004); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 7.72 (2000).
216 At least California, Illinois, Nebraska, Ohio, and Wisconsin considered, but did not
enact, such bills in 2004. See OWEN, supra note 8, at 674 n.204.
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